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JUSTICEBETWEEN A UTHORS
INTRODUCnON

Authors' copyright rights have traditionally been limited, because such
limitations were believed to be necessary to advance copyright law's
constitutionally-mandated utilitarian purpose- "to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts."1 But authors today-especially authors of digital
works-are increasingly turning to extra-copyright measures, including
encryption and "clickwrap" licenses, to customize their rights in their works
of authorship. Because such privately-ordered rights are (arguably) outside
of copyright law's framework, they are not necessarily subject to its
utilitarian mandate, and need not be made subject to limitations imposed by
copyright law on authors' rights. Yet even though such private ordering
regimes may not be subject to copyright law's utilitarian mandate justifying
limitations on authors' rights, other powerful justifications implicit in the
copyright regime support the imposition of limitations on authors' rights.
In this Article, I advance one such theoretical justification. Building upon
the foundational work of John Rawls, who has articulated a theory of justice
as "fairness," I develop a theory of justice between "generations" of authors
or justice between authors over time. This theory requires that the rights of
each "generation" of authors-including the rights that they might attempt
to assert through private ordering measures-be limited for the benefit of
subsequent generations of authors.
While not limited to authors' rights in digital works, the theory of
intergenerational or durational justice between authors that I advance is
particularly relevant to the burgeoning private ordering regime, in which
authors of digital works are increasingly using private ordering measures to
create for themselves virtually unlimited rights-in disregard of the interests
of future authors-even while they are benefitting from the limitations
copyright law has imposed on the rights of their predecessor authors.
Authors of electronic books, for example, are increasingly using "clickwrap"
licenses and encryption controls to prohibit readers from copying any
portion of their books, even while these authors have benefitted from
incorporating elements of earlier works into their own works. Motion
picture companies are increasingly using technological measures like
encryption devices to control access to and copying of their films released on
' The Constitution empowers Congress to enact copyright and patent statutes "to promote the
Progress of Science and the useful Arts." U.S. CONST., art. I, S 8, cl. 8.
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DVD, even while the filmmakers have benefitted from copying elements of
earlier works in developing their films. By the use of such private ordering
measures, present-day authors are able to reap the benefits of the limitations
on authors' rights previously imposed by copyright law, while casting aside
any limitations on their rights for the benefit of future authors. I contend
that the use of such private ordering measures to establish unlimited rights
in creative works is inconsistent with intergenerational justice obligations
imposed upon authors to preserve the raw materials of the creative process
for the benefit of future authors.
In Part I of this Article, I set forth the principal tenets of a general theory
of intergenerational or durational justice, drawing from the work of John
Rawls. As part of his general theory of justice as fairness, Rawls outlines a
theory of justice between generations or justice over time, and sets forth a
"just savings" principle according to which the generation into which one is
born is and should be rendered morally irrelevant. Under this theory of
justice between generations, the distribution of benefits and burdens made
available by cooperation in society is to be determined without reference to
an individual's temporal priority along the timeline of society. In particular,
individuals deliberating in a Rawlsian "original position" are charged with
choosing a principle of intergenerational savings that they would want all
previous generations to have followed (and later generations to follow), no
matter how far backward or forward in time. Regulated by a principle of
intergenerational savings, individuals within each generation are obliged to
forgo immediate gains that are available to them where necessary to protect
the interests of future generations.
Although intergenerational justice concerns have animated debates in the
environmental sphere, such concerns have yet to be articulated in the
intellectual property arena. In Part 1I, I apply the general principles of
intergenerational justice articulated in Part I to intellectual property rights
in creative works. In Part II.A, I explore the interests and motivations of
authors in an initial choice situation where no information is available to
them as to which generation along the timeline of society they belonged. I
contend that, behind such a Rawlsian veil of ignorance, authors would opt
for a system of required "savings" of creative works, which would translate
into substantial limitations on authors' rights in their works. Because
authors deliberating in this initial choice situation would not know whether
they belonged to an earlier or later creative generation and because such
authors would likely believe that the creative process entails the incorpora-

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol9/iss2/2

4

Nunziato: Justice Between Authors
2002]

JUSTICE BETWEEN A UTHORS

tion of some elements and uses of predecessors' works, they would find it in
their interests to limit authors' rights in their creative works across the
board. In exploring the interests and incentives operating upon authors
deliberating behind the veil of ignorance, I consider in Part lI.B the economic
analysis of authors' rights advanced by William Landes and Richard Posner.
Landes and Posner's analysis, while emanating from a different theoretical
framework, provides further support for the claim that authors would agree
ex ante to limitations on their rights for the benefit of the creative enterprise
in the long run.
In Part n.C, I anticipate and address some objections to this theory of
intergenerational justice in general and mandated intergenerational savings
of elements of creative works in particular. Richard Epstein, for one,
contends that any system of mandated intergenerational savings is inferior
to an unfettered market based on strong property rights in which we simply
rely upon individuals' natural predisposition to save for the benefit of their
progeny. While Epstein may be correct that we can and should generally
rely upon individuals' natural inclinations to save for their progeny, I
contend that such reliance is likely to be inadequate with respect to the
particular case of savings by authors for the benefit of subsequent authors.
In Part M, I take a fresh look at the limitations historically imposed by
copyright law on authors' rights from the perspective of justice between
authors. Although Congress and the courts have not explicitly adverted to
principles of intergenerational or durational justice in justifying limitations
on creators' rights, such themes inhere in the jurisprudence of copyright
limitations. Specifically, the limitations imposed on the term of copyright
protection, as well as limitations imposed by copyright law's idea/expression
dichotomy and fair use doctrine, have the effect of mandating the "savings"
of certain elements and uses of the creative process for the benefit of future
authors, at the expense of present authors. In myriad circumstances in
which authors have sought to wield their exclusive rights in ways that would
fail to preserve the raw materials of the creative process for subsequent
authors, copyright law has imposed significant limitations on creators' rights.
Because present authors acting in their own interests do not have sufficient
incentive to "save" for the benefit of future authors, copyright law has
traditionally mandated the savings of certain elements and uses of authors'
creative works for the benefit of future authors.
As I explore in Part IV, however, private ordering regimes for structuring
authors' rights, including those enabled by technological and contractual
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measures, embody no similar mandate of savings between authors over time.
With the use of technological measures such as encryption controls that
prohibit any and all copying of encrypted works, and of "clickwrap" licenses
that create perpetual rights in works and require users to waive their fair use
and other rights in such works, we are transitioning into a regime in which
present-day authors can benefit from the savings scheme previously
embodied in copyright law, without in turn having to suffer limitations on
their own rights for the benefit of subsequent authors. Within the incipient
private ordering regime, each creator is able to decide for herself, using her
private calculus of benefits and harms, how to design her rights in her
creative work, including whether to permit subsequent authors to make use
of any portion of her work. The danger thus arises that present authors will
choose to maximize their returns on their creative works at the expense of
subsequent authors, whose interests will not be adequately taken into
account. By enabling each author essentially to determine for herself the
scope and duration of her rights, private ordering regimes fail to account for
the interests of future authors.
In the recently enacted Digital Millennium Copyright Act,2 Congress
empowered authors to use technological measures, such as encryption
controls, to create for themselves virtually unlimited rights in their works.
Although such rights are subject to minor limitations, these limitations are
insufficient to protect the interests of future authors, as I discuss in Part IV.A.
Furthermore, authors are increasingly resorting to contractual measures,
such as clickwrap licenses, to create for themselves broad, perpetual rights in
their works. A newly promulgated uniform statute-the Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act 3-already adopted in several states, provides
a framework for the creation of broad, perpetual rights in certain types of
creative works. And courts that have been called upon to enforce essentially
unlimited contractual rights for authors generally have been unwilling to
read any limitations into such privately ordered rights, as I discuss in Part
IV.B.
Finally, in Part V, I contend that in order to carry forth into the digital
realm the commitment to justice between authors that is implicit in the

2 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, S1 (1998).

Unif. Computer Info. Transactions Act (Sept. 29,2000) [hereinafter UCITA]. All drafts of UCITA
are available fromthe Uniform Law Commissioner's official site at http://www.aw.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
ulc_.frame.htm (last visited Apr. 28, 2002).
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copyright regime, Congress and the courts should continue to impose
substantial limitations on authors' rights, whether protected by public or
private ordering measures. Although the migration of creative works to the
digital realm may require some recalibration of the limitations historically
imposed on creators' rights, durational justice concerns require that the
interests of future authors be protected, as they traditionally have been in the
copyright regime, by mandating the "savings" of components of earlier
authors' creative works. Toward this end, I propose several ways in which
limitations should be imposed on authors' privately ordered rights so as to
embody a form of justice between authors in the digital age.
I. TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE
A. INTRODUCTION

The subject of intergenerational justice or justice over time, while
touched upon in the works of theorists over the past several centuries,4 has
been explicitly examined only recently.' Theorists throughout the centuries
exploring issues of distributive justice have primarily focused on the subject
of intragenerational justice-that is, how to establish a just social system for
allocating the benefits and burdens of social cooperation among individuals
existing in society at any given time and belonging roughly to the same
generation.6 Beginning in the 1950s and 60s, however, theorists focusing on
issues such as the mistreatment of non-renewable environmental resources,
the rapid growth of the world population, and the funding of an ongoing

'Throughout the past centuries, only a handful of thinkers have hinted at the issue of
intergenerational justice. Edmund Burke, writing in 1790, opined that:
Society is indeed a contract ...a partnership in all art, a particular in every virtue,
and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many
generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but
between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTONS ON THE REVOLUTION iN FRANCE (1790).

Nineteenth Century

philosopher Henry Sidgwick also alluded to concerns of intergenerational justice, when he asked: "How
far are we to consider the interests of posterity when they seem to conflict with those of existing human
beings? ... (The time at which a man exists cannot affect the value of his happiness from a universal point
of view; and . . .interests of posterity must concern a utilitarian as much as those of his
contemporaries .... " HENRY SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 385 (MacMillan 1962).
s See generally PETER LASLETT & JAMES S. FItsHKiN, JusTICE BETWEEN AGE GROUPS AND
GENERATIONS 1-23 (1992).

SSee generally Laslett & Fishkin, supra note 5, at 14-22.
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system of social security, began to consider whether and to what extent
concerns of intergenerational justice served to impose limitations on the
rights of those in the present generation in the interests of those to be born
into future generations.! Such intergenerational theories of justice examined
whether and how the rights of those in present generations should be limited
to safeguard the interests of those in generations to come. 8
In essence, the intergenerational justice inquiry sets off in two directions.
First, from the perspective of the present generation, we may ask, what is it
reasonable for us to expect from the previous generation-in the way of
sacrifices made on our behalf, either in the form of savings for our benefit or
actions taken to prevent harm from being visited upon our generation.
Prospectively, the question becomes, what limitations on our rights would
be reasonable to impose in the interests of generations to come? For all but
the very first and last generations in the timeline of society, the
intergenerational justice inquiry is both forward-looking and backwardlooking, and can be structured as a hypothetical tripartite contract between
(1) the present generation; (2) the preceding generation(s); and (3) the
succeeding generation(s). As Peter Laslett observes regarding the structure
of this tripartite contract,
If each successive generation is regarded as having both
rights and duties, then the rights that any given generation
(here generation 2) has in its predecessor (generation 1) are
met by the duties it performs for its successor (generation 3).
[As such], the rights a generation has in preceding generahave to be performed
tions are matched by the duties that
9
come.
to
yet
toward generations
B. iNTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE AND RAWLS' THEORY OF JUSTICE

In developing the outlines of a general theory of intergenerational justice,
I begin with John Rawls' groundbreaking treatment of this subject in his

See, ag., Martin Golding, Ethical Issues in BiologicalEngineering,15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 443 (1968);

Martin Golding, Obligations to FutureGenerations, 56 MONIST 85 (1972); R.I. SIKORA & BRIAN BARRY,
EDS., OBUGATIONS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS (1978); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).

Laslett & Fishkin, supra note 5, at 26.
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1971 treatise A Theory ofJustice.0 In order to benefit from Rawls' substantial
contributions toward a theory of intergenerational justice, it will be
necessary to first review the fundamental elements of Rawls' theory of
justice, which he denominates "justice as fairness."" After briefly reviewing
the basic structure of Rawls' theory of justice, I then focus in detail on
Rawls' treatment of intergenerational justice and intergenerational savings
in particular.
1. The Subject ofJustice in "A Theory ofJustice". The primary subject of
Rawls' theory of justice as fairness is that of social justice-i.e., the manner
in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and
duties and determine the division of advantages and disadvantages that result
from social cooperation.' According to Rawls, justice is and must be
conceptualized as the most important virtue of the major social institutions.13
If a social institution is not just, it must be restructured or reformulated to
render it just.14 The major social institutions that comprise the subject of
justice include the principal economic and social arrangements of society,
including the legal protection of freedom of thought, freedom of conscience,
and-notably for our purposes-systems of property."5 Given that intellectual property is an increasingly significant component of the private
property system, it is worthwhile to explore the implications of justice as
fairness in general-and intergenerational justice in particular-for systems
of intellectual property.
2. The OriginalPosition and the Two Principles ofJustice. Rawls first
attempts to derive a set of principles for assigning the rights and duties in the
major social institutions and for defining the appropriate distribution of the
benefits and burdens that result from social cooperation. 16 He expounds a
theory of an initial position of equality among individuals in society by
elaborating upon and "carryfing] to a higher level of abstraction" the social
contract-the traditional expository device of political philosophers."

JOHN RAWIS, A THEORY OF Jus-CE (1971).
SId at 3.
1

14

I at 4-7. See also ia at 54-58.
Id at 3.

Id

1s RAWLS, supra note 10, at 7, 55.
1 Id at 4-5.

" Rawls presents a conception of justice as fairness that "generalizes and carries to a higher level of
abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract," id at 11, as found in the theories of political
philosophers such as Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. Within Rawls' theory, the original position of equality
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Generalizing from earlier social contract theories, Rawls develops a theory
of an initial choice situation in order to elicit the principles that free and
rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an
initial position of equality defining the fundamental terms of their association." In developing a theory of justice and exploring the fair terms of social
cooperation, Rawls first imposes certain limits or constraints on arguments
in the initial choice situation that embody the foundational elements of
justice as fairness. The "original position"-the most favorable interpretation
of the initial situation"-is an expository device that imposes certain
constraints on arguments for arriving at the fair terms of social cooperation.
These constraints are imposed by virtue of the "veil of ignorance,"" behind
which individuals formulate arguments and deliberate regarding the
principles of justice, and behind which it is not possible for individuals to
tailor the principles of justice to favor their own social or natural circumstances. Thus, behind the veil of ignorance, in bargaining over the proper
distribution of the benefits and burdens resulting from social cooperation,
individuals cannot know their place in society, class position, social status,
race, gender, intelligence, strength, or other aspects of their fortune in the
distribution of natural or social assets or abilities.2 1 Nor can they know their
own detailed conception of the good or particulars of their rational plans of
life.2 Given this lack of knowledge regarding individual features and
characteristics, no one in the original position can design the principles of
justice to favor his or her particular conditions or circumstances. 3 Knowledge of such characteristics is shielded from the individuals deliberating
behind the veil of ignorance because such social and natural circumstances
are morally irrelevant from the perspective of justice as fairness.2 4 The veil
of ignorance is therefore designed to embody the constraint that these

corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social contract. Id at 12.
"

Id at 11.

"Rawls defines the original position as the "interpretation of the initial situation that best expresses
the conditions that are widely thought reasonable to impose on the choice of principles yet which, at the
same time, leads to a conception that characterizes our considered judgments in reflective equilibrium."
IL at 121.
Id at 18.
21 Id at 136-42.
m Id at 136-37.
2d Id at 139.
24 RAWLS, supra note 10, at 141.
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occluded features and characteristics are irrelevant, and therefore should be
made irrelevant, from the standpoint of justice.2"
The original position serves as an expository device that sums up the
meaning of the conditions we would be prepared to impose on arguments in
formulating principles of justice that will define the distribution of benefits
and burdens resulting from social cooperation.26 In Rawls' words:
We can, as it were, enter [the original position] at any
moment simply by conducting our moral reasoning about
first principles in accordance with the stipulated procedural
constraints. . . . [The original position] is an attempt to
represent and unify the formal and general elements of our
moral thought in a manageable and vivid construction in
order to use these elements to determine which first principles of justice are the most reasonable."
The constraints in the original position are those that we would be prepared
to regard as limits on the fair terms of social cooperation.2 8 As a result, the
principles of justice that are chosen in the original position are those that
"rational persons concerned to advance their own interests would consent to
as equals, where none are known to be advantaged or disadvantaged by social
or natural contingencies."29
As discussed above, many features of the deliberating parties' social and
natural characteristics are hidden from them in the initial choice situation.
However, in order to "generate the minimal motivations necessary to get a
problem of rational choice going,"" the deliberating parties need to have
some information available to them. Accordingly, the individuals in the
original position do know that they are motivated to increase their share of
"primary social goods 3 1-i.e., rights and liberties, opportunities and powers,
income and wealth"2-goods that will enable them to promote their own

25

Id

26

Id. at 21.

2

JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 275 (1993). See also RAwIS, supra note 10, at 19, 138.

n RAWiS, supra note 10, at 21.

2Id at 19.
0 See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERAusm AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 25 (1982).
31 RAWiS, supra note 10, at 142-44.
'2

Id at 92-93.
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particular conception of the good most effectively, whatever it turns out to
be." Further, the individuals deliberating behind the veil of ignorance are
rational and mutually disinterested 3 -i.e., they do not take an interest in one
another's interests and are not motivated to advance the wen-being of other
individuals in society." Rawls stipulates further that the deliberating parties
are risk-averse and concerned to minimize their worst possible outcomes. 6
They also know that their society is subject to the circumstances of
justice-i.e., that many individuals coexist together in a definite geographical
territory, that their society is subject to moderate scarcity, and that they are
capable of a sense of justice." Finally-and importantly for the subject of
intergenerational justice-Rawls posits, consistent with his present time of
entry interpretation,38 that the individuals deliberating behind the veil know
that they are contemporaries-all belonging to the same
generation-although they do not know the particular circumstances of their
own society, the level of culture it has been able to achieve, or to which
generation in particular they belong.39 The parties deliberating behind the
veil of ignorance "must choose principles the consequences of which they are
prepared to live with whatever generation they turn out to belong to. " '
Having set forth the circumstances of the original position as constraints
on the deliberating parties' arguments, Rawls then establishes that the parties
would select the following two fundamental principles of justice, 4' to be
ranked and applied in "lexical order": 2
(1)each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with
a similar system of liberty for all; and
(2)social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so
that they are both (a) to the greatest benefit of the least
advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle,

"

Id at 144.

"

Id at 139.
Id at 13.

Id at 152-61.
I at 126, 137, 145.
Id at 140.
Id at 136.
4 Id
Id4at 219.
a Id at 61, 63, 302.
6
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and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity."3
These two principles dictate that "all primary social goods are to be
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods
is to the advantage of the least favored,"" consistent with the just savings
principle.

3. The Principleof IntergenerationalJustice and the Just Savings Principle.
In A Theory ofJustice Rawls provides the first extended treatment of the
subject of intergenerational justice, which he characterizes as among the most
difficult of the issues confronting any theory of justice.4 In setting out the
basic contours of the principle of justice between generations, Rawls
contends, first, that the generation into which an individual is born is
morally irrelevant from the perspective of social justice: "In first principles
of justice we are not allowed to treat generations differently solely on the
grounds that they are earlier or later in time."' Therefore, the major social
institutions-including systems of property-must be structured so as to
reflect this moral irrelevance. Whether an individual is born in 1950 or 2050
should not affect that individual's distribution of rights and liberties,
opportunities and powers, income and wealth. Rather, we must view the life
of a people as a "scheme of cooperation spread out in historical time, ...
[which] is to be governed by the same conception of justice that regulates the
cooperation of contemporaries. [As such], no generation has stronger claims
than any other [to distribution of primary social goods]."" Thus, the first
important component of Rawls' principle of intergenerational justice is that
the temporal priority of individuals-i.e., when they arrive on the timeline
of society-entails no moral priority, and should be made morally irrelevant
in structuring the major social institutions.
Because an individual's temporal priority-like her gender, race, wealth,
etc.-is morally irrelevant within Rawls' theory of intergenerational justice,
one might suppose Rawls would design the circumstances of the original

4) Id at 60, 302.
4'

Id at 303.
Rawls states that the problem of justice between generations subjects any ethical theory to 'severe

if not impossible tests,* id at 284, but that an account of distributive justice would be incomplete without
a discussion of this subject. Id
46
4

Id at 295.
Id at 289.
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position so as to obscure from the deliberating parties knowledge about
which generation they belong. If one's generational association along the
timeline of society were obscured behind the veil of ignorance, a deliberating
party would not be permitted to adopt principles tending to favor her
generation, because she would not know to which generation she belonged.
Rawls, however, consistent with his "present time of entry" interpretation,"
rejects the idea of conceptualizing the original position as a "general assembly
which includes at one moment everyone who will live at some time [or)...
as an assembly of everyone who could live at some time."4 9 Instead, he
chooses to design the original position such that the deliberating parties
know that they are contemporaries-all belonging to the same generation.'
Because Rawls structures the original position such that the parties
deliberating in the original position know that they belong to the same
generation, it is possible that the parties would choose to disregard the
interests of their successor generations-since no one in the original position
represents the interests of successor generations and since the deliberating
parties have an incentive to maximize their (and their generation's) share of
primary social goods."' Yet, Rawls intends to design the circumstances of the
original position to reflect the principle that no generation has stronger
claims than any other as to the distribution of primary social goods. The
deliberating parties' knowledge that they all belong to the same generation
thus presents a theoretical difficulty with respect to the design of the
circumstances of the original position to generate principles that reflect
concerns of intergenerational justice. Put another way, Rawls intends to
structure the circumstances of the original position such that earlier
generations will not choose principles for distributing the benefits and
burdens of social cooperation in disregard of the interests of subsequent
generations. However, because the deliberating parties in the original
position know that they all belong to the same generation, adopting a savings
principle can only hurt them. 2 This presents the complication that, in
arriving at the principles of justice and designing the major social institu-

IL at 140.
Id at 292, 139. Such an interpretation would "stretch fantasy too far [such that] the conception
would cease to be a natural guide to intuition." Id at 139.
"Id at 139.
'* Recall that the parties in the original position are presumed to be rational and mutually
disinterested. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
52 RAWIS, supra note 10, at 292.
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tions, the deliberating parties might choose to favor their own generation
and decline to make any sacrifices at all for their successors.5 3
Rawls first attempts to deal with this theoretical difficulty by introducing
the motivational assumption of "intergenerational care" ' as operating on the
deliberating parties, which reflects our natural tendency to care for the wellbeing of our immediate descendents. Pursuant to this motivational
assumption, Rawls posits that each person deliberating in the original
position cares about the well-being of some of those in the next generation:
"The parties are regarded as representing family lines . . . with ties of
sentiment between successive generations.""5 Thus, "for each party in the
original position, we assume that their goodwill stretches over at least two
generations."' This attempt to set up the conditions of deliberation so as to
generate obligations of intergenerational savings has been met with
substantial criticism. Bruce Ackerman, for one, contends that Rawls'
motivational assumption of "intergenerational care" is inconsistent with the
predominant motivational assumptions operating in the original position of
the absence of intragenerational care. 7 Recall that Rawls posits that the
parties deliberating in the original position are mutually disinterested and are
not concerned to advance anyone else's well-being but their own," an
assumption that appears inconsistent with the motivational assumption of
intergenerational care. In response to this and other criticisms of his

53 jd4

" Id at 128. Other theorists writing on the subject of intergenerational justice have made similar
assumptions. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Paul A. Hemmersbaugh, The Shadow of the Future Discount
Rates, Later Generations,and the Environment, 46 VAND. L. REV. 267, 294 (1993) (working out an
intergenerational savings principle with respect to public goods, "the optimum social decision requires the
current generation as a whole to sacrifice the collective consumption needed to provide the desired level
of public goods in the future.... [Tihe objective remains to approximate the level of sacrifice that each
family would undertake willingly, in the absence of a free ride, to provide the benefits of public goods to
their descendents alone. The aggregate of those individual sacrifices would provide the necessary collective
sacrifice required of the current generation.*). Richard Epstein also assumes a genetic predisposition to
care for the well-being of one's descendents. Richard Epstein, Justice Across the Generations,67 TX. L.
REv. 1465, 1467 (1989).
s RAWLS, supra note 10, at 292.

See also id at 288 (deliberating on a just savings principle, "it isassumed that a generation cares for
its immediate descendents, as fathers say care for their sons").
s' See BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIALJUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 225 (1980). Ackerman contends

that 'this altruistic psychology attributed to the contractors considering intergenerational concerns starkly
contrasts with the self-interested psychology of contractors confronting intragenerational conflicts." Id
at 224-25.
52 See RAWLS, supra note 10, at 139.
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introduction of the motivational assumption of intergenerational care as a
vehicle for generating intergenerational obligations, 9 Rawls subsequently
modified his formulation of the conditions of the original position to remove
its dependence upon this motivational assumption. In his revised formulation of the conditions in the original position in PoliticalLiberalism,6 Rawls
posits that the deliberating parties are required
to agree to a savings principle subject to the further condition that they must want all previous generations to have
followed it. Thus the correct[savings]principleis that which
the members of any generation(andso all generations)would
adoptas the one theirgenerationis tofollow andas the principle
they would want preceding generationsto bavefollowed (and
latergenerationstofollow), no matterhowfarback (orforward)
in time.61
Although the details of Rawls' motivational assumptions operating upon
the parties deliberating regarding intergenerational justice and
intergenerational savings have undergone some revisions, the general outlines
of such assumptions are straightforward. In arriving at a just savings
principle,
[T]he ethical problem [facing the deliberating parties] is that
of agreeing on a path over time which treats all generations

"Other commentators have advanced criticisms of Rawls' introduction of the motivational
assumption of intergenerational care into the circumstances of the original position. Jane English
contends that if Rawls wishes to structure the deliberation in the original position so as to render the
generation to which one belongs irrelevant, Rawls should abandon his construction that all parties in the
original position are contemporaries and should imagine instead a meeting at which al/ generations are
represented, with the veil of ignorance concealing from them the (morally irrelevant) information of
which generation they belong to. Jane English,JuticeBeteen Generations, 31 PHILOSOPI-CAL STUDIES
91, 99 (1977). Rawls, however, rejects this formulation because it isinconsistent with his present time of
entry interpretation, as discussed in text accompanying notes 39-40. Furthermore, English contends that
even if we assume that the deliberating parties are motivated by intergenerational care as described by
Rawls--with at least one person in the present generation caring about the well-being of at least one
person in the next generation-this formulation can only generate short-term, not long-term, savings.
English, supra, at 99.
6 RAWLS, supranote 27, at 274. SeeansoJoHNRAWLs,JUSTICE As FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 15862(2001).
61 14
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justly during the whole course of society's history.... No
generation has stronger claims than any other. In attempting to estimate the fair rate of savings, the persons in the
original position [must consider] what is reasonable for
members of adjacent generations to expect of one another at
each level of advance. They [must attempt to] piece together
a just savings schedule by balancing how much at each stage
they would be willing to save for their immediate descendants against what they would feel entitled to claim of their
immediate predecessors... [until they] arrive at an estimate
that seems fair from both sides.62
Since no one [in the original position] knows to which
generation he belongs, the question [of how to craft a just
savings principle] is viewed from the standpoint of each
[generation] and a fair accommodation is expected by the
principle adopted. All generations are virtually represented
inthe original position.63
[In formulating a just savings principle,] the persons in the
original position are to ask themselves how much they
would be willing to save at each stage of advance on the
assumption that all other generations are to save at the same
rates. That is, they are to consider their willingness to save
at any given phase of civilization with the understanding
that the rates they propose are to regulate the whole span of
accumulation [across the span of historical time] .... [T]hey
must choose a just savings principle that assigns an appropriate rate of accumulation to each level of advance."
The process of accumulation, once it is begun and carried
through, is to the good of all subsequent generations.65

62

6'

RAWLS, supra note 10, at 289.
IM at 28.
Madat 287.
Id at 288.
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In sum, Rawls posits that each generation, regulated by the principle of
intergenerational justice that would be chosen in the original position, is to
pass along to the next generation a certain amount of savings for the benefit
of society as a whole. Such savings can be conceptualized as being made "in
return for what is received from previous generations that enables the later
[generations] to enjoy a better life in a more just society."" Accordingly,
"savings is achieved by accepting as a political judgment those policies
designed to improve the standard of life of later generations of the least
advantaged, thereby abstaining from the immediate gains that are
available." 6' Acting in accordance with a just savings principle, "the present
generation cannot do as it pleases, but is bound by the principles that would
be chosen in the original position to define justice between persons at
different moments of time.""6
Under Rawls' formulation of just savings for future generations, the
subject of such savings is not limited to financial wealth. Rather, Rawls
explicitly extends the just savings principle to savings in terms of intellectual,
educational, and cultural "capital." 69 Regulated by Rawls' principle of
intergenerational savings, members of earlier generations are not only
required to contribute their fair share to the material riches of society; they
must also contribute to the cultural advances that have been made by society
at each stage of advance. 0 In Rawls' words:
The process of accumulation, once it is begun and carried
through, is to the good of all subsequent generations. Each
passes on to the next a fair equivalent in real capital as
defined by the just savings principle.... [Clapital is not
only factories and machines... but also the knowledge and
culture, as well as the techniques or skills, that make possible
just institutions and the fair value of liberty."

6

Iat 288.
Id at 292-93.

"

Id. at 293.
d at 288.

The savings required of each generation is to encompass "investment in learning and education"
and obligates each generation to "raisfe] the standard of civilization and culture." Id at 286.
" Id at 288.
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Thus, Rawls claims that the just savings principle requires each generation
to pass on to the next generation the level of culture and learning achieved
by society up to that point.
After setting forth the conditions operating upon the contracting parties
in deliberating upon a just savings principle and the subject of such savings,
Rawls provides a broad outline of the savings principle that would be chosen
in the original position. While claiming that it is not possible to define with
any precision the rate of just savings,7' he contends that the proper just
savings principle would obligate each generation not only to preserve the
gains in culture and civilization achieved by previous generations, but further
to augment 3 and contribute their fair share to the wealth of society, above
and beyond the contributions that have been made by previous generations.74

7

Id at 286.

I'di at 293.
7 Rawls' claim that the proper intergenerational savings principle requires each generation not
merely to preserve but to augment the gains in culture and civilization has been criticized by theorists
such as Bruce Ackerman. In his treatise SocialJusticeand the Liberal State, Bruce Ackerman contends that
Rawls has not adequately justified his claim that parties deliberating behind the veil would choose a savings
principle that imposed the obligation on each generation not merely to preserve but to augment the
material and cultural wealth of society. Ackerman argues that, on Rawls' own line of reasoning, the
deliberating parties would opt not for a steadily increasing just savings program, but instead for an
intergenerational trusteeship:
If anything is fundamental to A Theory of Justice, it is the claim that rational
contractors will, when making their fundamental choices, focus exclusively upon
their worst possible outcomes. In the present case, this means the contractors will be
unimpressed by the fact that [Rawls']"just savings" generates higher welfare to people
lucky enough to land in the later generations. Instead, they will concentrate upon
the sacrifices 'just savings" imposes on those who come earlier.... One would
expect Rawls to predict that the liberal principle of trusteeship would be the
unanimous choice of his original contractors, for they end up worse off under "just
savings" if they find themselves in the first generation after leaving the original

position.
The only trouble is that Rawls says just the opposite. He tells us that the

contractors [acting under the motivational assumption of intergenerational care]...
are concerned with the welfare of their entire bloodline. . . . [Why must a
responsible family head want more for his children than he gets for himself? Why is
it not enough to bring the child to a level of welfare equal to that the parent himself
enjoys? It is always possible to short-circuit these questions simply by stipulating that
all contractors have the psychology of the quintessential Jewish mother, but this
stipulation will hardly convince parents of other temperaments.
Id at 224-25. Ackerman thus claims that Rawls has not adequately justified the adoption of a just savings
principle in which earlier generations are required to do more than preserve or hold in trust for future
generations the material and cultural wealth of society. Instead, Ackerman contends that rather than
adopting a steadily increasing savings principle, rational risk-averse contractors would adopt an
intergenerationaltrusteeship. In Ackerman's version of the intergenerational trusteeship: "so long as each
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Regulated by a principle of intergenerational justice, persons within each
generation are therefore charged with the duty to maintain and toffurther
just social institutions and to advance the (material and cultural) wealth of
society for the benefit of successor generations. 5
Under Rawls' just savings principle, in terms of cultural wealth, it would
not be enough for earlier generations to simply preserve for future generations the developments in the arts and sciences that were achieved by
previous generations. Rather, each generation has a duty broadly to advance
and take to a higher level the advancement in the arts and sciences that have
been made by its predecessor generations. Each generation is charged with
the duty to improve upon the standard of life of later generations by

furthering the level of advance of cultural and material wealth that had been
achieved by previous generations.76
generation does not deplete the per capita share of capital available to the next, further accumulation may
not be demanded in the name of trusteeship, nor can less be justified." Id at 213, 227. See also Ronald
Dworkin, Symposium on the Public Benefits ofthe Arts and Humanities,9 COLUM.-VLA J. LAW & THE
ARTs 123, 156-57 ("We inherit a cultural structure, and we have some duty, out of simple justice, to leave
that structure at least as rich as we found it.").
Although an important theoretical debate, the issue dividing Rawls and Ackerman-whether
intergenerational justice requires maintaining or augmenting society's cultural and material capital-is not
pivotal for the subject of this Article, viz., the transition from a publicly ordered regime of creators' rights
to a privately ordered regime. Rather, the more pressing issue is whether present-day creators-who have
benefitted from a system of mandated "savings" with respect to creative works-can now establish a
system in which savings for the benefit of future creators is no longer required. The question becomes
whether present-day creators should be permitted to assert unlimited rights in their creative works and
essentially abandon even the limited Ackermanian duty to serve as trustees for society's cultural advances
achieved up to this point.
7 RAWLM, supra note 10, at 290.
' Rawls claims that, at some point, further increases in the wealth of society will be counterproductive and will not serve to improve later generations' standard of life. The generations "are not bound to
go on maximizing indefinitely," i4i at 289; excessive and ever.increasing accumulation of material wealth
can constitute a "positive hindrance" to society. Id at 290. Thus, at a certain stage of development of
society, subsequent generations are no longer required to further the wealth of society, but are only
charged with the obligation of maintainingsuch wealth. See also id at 298 ("The just savings principle acts
as a constraint on the rate of accumulation. Each age is to do its fair share in achieving the conditions
necessary for just institutions and the fair value of liberty; but beyond this more cannot be required.").
It is unclear whether this same cap imposed by Rawls on his steadily increasing savings principle applies,
mutatis mxtandis, with respect to the cultural wealth of society. Can it be said that at some point,
advances in culture and knowledge would constitute a "hindrance" to society, and that therefore the
proper interpretation of the savings principle for such later generations would only require them to
preserve, but not to advance, the cultural wealth of society? Because advances in culture and learning
arguably continue to improve the quality of life of a society and do not have the same capacity for
distraction as does excessive accumulation of material wealth, the reasoning supporting Rawls' imposition
of a cap on the steadily increasing just rate of savings in the realm of material and financial wealth does
not necessarily carry over to the realm of cultural advancement. See id at 287 ("Once just institutions are
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In sum, Rawls advances a theory of justice between generations or justice
over time, and a just savings principle, in which the generation into which
one is born is and should be rendered morally irrelevant. According to such
a theory, the distribution of benefits and burdens made available by
cooperation in society is determined without reference to an individual's
temporal priority along the timeline of society. In particular, individuals
deliberating in the original position are required to choose a principle of
intergenerational savings that they would want all previous generations to
have followed (and later generations to follow), no matter how far backward
or forward in time. Members of each generation must attempt to craft a just
savings principle by balancing how much they would be willing to save for
future generations against what they would feel entitled to claim of prior
generations, until they reach a principle that seems fair and reasonable from
both sides to govern the span of savings across time. Regulated by a
principle of intergenerational savings, individuals within each generation are
obliged to forgo immediate gains that are available to them where necessary
to preserve (and augment) for future generations a certain standard of life,
measured not only in financial terms, but also in terms of society's cultural
and intellectual advancement.
II. JUSTICE BETWEEN AUTHORS
The principle of justice over time and accompanying just savings principle
articulated in Part I have important implications forthe design of systems of
private property in general and for the design of intellectual property rights
in particular. In this Part, I contend that systems of rights in creative works
should be designed, consistent with intergenerational justice obligations, to
embody a commitment on the part of earlier "generations" of authors to
preserve certain elements and uses of their creative works for the benefit of
future generations-even where doing so requires the present generation of
creators to "abstain[ ] from the immediate gains that are available"" to them.
In developing this argument, I first structure a Rawlsian initial choice

firmly established, the net accumulation required falls to zero. At this point, a society meets its duty of
justice by maintaining just institutions and preserving their material base.*) (emphasis added). Thus,
although the duty imposed upon each generation to further the material wealth of society at some point
of advance converts to the duty to merely maintain such wealth, it is not clear whether the same can be
said with respect to the cultural wealth of society.
" RAWLS, supra note 10, at 292-93.
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situation in which authors deliberate regarding the scope of rights in creative
works. In order to generate a just savings principle that is consistent with
obligations of intergenerational justice, I set up the initial choice situation
such that the generation to which each deliberating party belongs is obscured
from him or her. Parties deliberating in this initial choice situation are then
charged with the task of choosing a just savings principle that treats all
generations of creators justly over time.
A. OBLIGATIONS OF INTERGENERATIONAL JUSTICE AND SYSTEMS OF
RIGHTS IN CREATIVE WORKS

1. Constructingthe Initial ChoiceSituation. In modeling an initial choice
situation to generate principles governing the protection of creative works
consistent with the obligations of intergenerational justice, it must first be
determined what range of interests will be taken into account by the
deliberating parties. The initial choice situation could be structured to take
into account a wide range of interests across the entire spectrum from
creators to non-creators. The non-creator end of the spectrum would
encompass the interests of those who stand to benefit from access to creative
works, either by the mere edification that comes from such access, or by
their eventual incorporation of such works into their own creations. The
problem of designing a system of protections that balances the need to
incentivize creation through strong property rights against the need to
encourage access by limiting such property rights is a familiar one that
centers primarily around intragenerational justice concerns, which focuses
on the distribution of benefits among individuals belonging roughly to the
same generation. In working out an initial choice situation in which
individuals deliberate on the scope of rights in creative works, I will instead
focus on the intergenerational obligations imposed on earlier generations of
authors to successor generations of authors.7"
In this section, I consider the conflicting interests and incentives operating
upon successive generations of creators, so as to explore the development of

" This project is more relevant to the task of justifying to present-day authors limitations on their
rights. That is to say, if the interests represented in the initial choice situation encompass only the
interests of authors, and if nonetheless the principle emerging out of the deliberations imposes limitations
on authors' rights, then the justification for such limitations would be more appealing to present-day
authors.
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a principle of justice between authors over time. Consistent with analyzing
the obligations of intergenerational justice for systems of rights in creative
works, the authors deliberating in this initial situation would not know to
which authorial generation they belonged, whether they were born into an
earlier and less culturally advanced society, or to a later, culturally advanced
stage of society. That is to say, each author deliberating on the scope of
rights in creative works would not know whether, upon leaving the original
position, she would be creating within the cultural context of the Nineteenth
or the Twenty-First Century, for example. She would not know who had
written before her, what ideas had previously been embodied in works of
authorship, or to what extent the process of creating her works of authorship would be dependent upon incorporating elements of works that came
before her.
The authors deliberating in the original position would be charged with
developing a system of rights in creative works that would be fair and
reasonable to authors regardless of which creative generation across the span
of historical time they belonged. The savings principle that would be chosen
in this initial situation with respect to creative works would be the one that
members of any authorial generation (and so all authorial generations) would
adopt as the one their generation is to follow and as the principle they would
want all previous generations to have followed and future generations to
follow, no matter how far backward or forward in time. In selecting this
savings principle, the deliberating parties would consider what is fair and
reasonable for adjacent generations of creators to expect from one another,
and would select a just savings principle that assigns an appropriate rate of
savings to each level of advance over time. Deliberating authors would
consider, for example, what sort of savings it would be reasonable for them
to expect on the part of authors who precede them whose works they will
likely build upon in creating their own works. Concomitantly, deliberating
authors would evaluate such a savings principle in light of the sacrifices it
would impose upon them (in terms of forgone profits) by requiring them to
save for the benefit of future authors.
2. The Savings of Works oflntellectualProperty.Throughout my analysis,
I have implicitly assumed that some measure of "savings" on the part of
predecessor authors is required to protect the interests of future authors, and
have therefore suggested that authors deliberating in an initial choice
situation regarding the scope of property rights in creative works would opt
for some form of "savings" with respect to such works. But this first claim,

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2002

23

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 2

J. INTELL. PROP.L.

[Vol. 9:219

and the assumptions it embodies about the nature of the creative process,
calls for closer scrutiny. What precisely is meant in this context by the
savings of creative works for the benefit of future creators? If I write a novel
or a song or a software program, in what sense must such works, or elements
of such works, be saved or preserved for the benefit of future creators? The
subject of our inquiry is works of intellectual property, which, unlike
tangible property, can be enjoyed and consumed by many without
diminishment, so what sense does it make to speak of the need for savings
with respect to such works? It is one thing to require non-renewable natural
resources like oil and gas, or intangible resources like financial capital, to be
saved for the benefit of future generations. But for works of intellectual
property, like novels and songs and software, which can be consumed by
many without diminishment, why must certain elements or uses of them be
preserved for the benefit of future creators?
The answer inheres in the recognition that even though works of
intellectual property are non-rivalrous as regards their consumption, they are
nonetheless excludable. That is to say, by virtue of one's intellectual
property rights, an author can exclude others from making use of or
incorporating elements of her work absent authorization. If authors can
exclude others from making use of their works without their permission,
such a right to exclude, if construed too broadly, will impinge upon the
ability of future authors to create-at least if and to the extent that the nature
of the creative process entails building upon elements of pre-existing works.
Put simply, if I write the first blues song, and the state grants me a property
right in that song, then depending upon the extent of that property right, I
may be able to prohibit others from singing their own blues. If I write the
first opera or play about starving artists struggling to make ends meet, then
depending upon the extent of that property right, I may be able to prohibit
others from writing their own version of the same." If I write the first
database spreadsheet program, then depending upon the extent of my
property rights in that program, I may be able to prohibit others from
writing an improved and competing spreadsheet program. 0

" To use a well-known example, if the copyright owner of the opera La Bobeme exercised exclusive
rights regarding the portrayal of the opera's underlying ideas, then the owner could prevent the musical
Rent from being made.
' See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1014 (1st Cir.
1995), affid by an equally dividedS. CQ., 516 U.S. 233 (1996).
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Yet, the scope of property rights in creative works is only problematic
from the standpoint of justice between authors if the creative process is
conceptualized as one that necessarily entails the incorporation of elements
of pre-existing creative works. If and to the extent that the creative process
is conceptualized as one that necessarily entails building upon elements of
pre-existing creative works-or what I will call the "recombinative
conception" of the creative process-then some measure of savings of creative
works is necessary for the creative process to flourish in the long run. If and
to the extent that the creative process is conceptualized as one that involves
truly and utterly original creation-or what I will call the "ex nihilo"
conception of the creative process"- then savings of creative works would
not be necessary for the creative process to flourish in the long run. Because
the adoption of one over the other competing conception of the creative
process is a highly relevant input to the parties' deliberations in the initial
choice situation regarding the selection of a just savings principle for creative
works, it will be worthwhile to explore these contrasting conceptions of the
creative process in greater detail.
3. Conceptions ofthe CreativeProcess. Within the "ex nihilo" conception
of the creative process, creators are conceptualized as creating their works
out of thin air or out of nothing, 2 and creators therefore have no inherent
need to rely upon or make use of elements of pre-existing creative works.83
In the words of philosopher James Child, an exponent of the ex nihilo
conception, the process of creating intellectual property is one in which ideas
are "thought of and, thus, created (or discovered) and appropriated ex nihilo,
merely by hard (and creative) thought.... [The underlying components of
intellectual property are] created out of nothing but mental labor. [The
creator doesn't] even need raw materials ... .," Child contends further that

,1 See, eg.,JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, ANDSPLEENS 156 (1996) (discussing the "ex nihilo"
conception of the creative process).
U See, eg., Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 38 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 109, 110 (1991) (stating that
copyright is about "sustaining the conditions of creativity that enable an individual to craft out of thin
air an AppalachianSpring, A Sun Also Rises, A Citizen Kane), quotedin BOYLE, supra note 81, at 156.
" See BOYLE, supra note 81, at 56-57 (comparing conception of novelist who 'crafts out of thin air,"
who "does not need a rich and fertile public domain on which to draw," and conception of artistry in
which development is based on pre-existing material, in which "poetry can only be made out of other
poems, novels out of other novels').
'4 See James W. Child, The MoralFoundationsof Intangible Propeny, 73 THE MONIST 578 (1990),
reprinted in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, MORAL, LEGAL, AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 68-69

(Adam D. Moore, ed. 1997).

Furthermore, Child argues that (to the extent that creation requires
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because the stuff of intellectual property (unlike the stuff of real property)
is inexhaustible and because the process of creation is one in which creators
create ex nihilo, limitations imposed on intellectual property in order to
preserve the raw materials of the creative process for other creators are
unwarranted. Taking ideas as one example of the underlying components
of intellectual property, Child contends that
... [I]deas are not like real property.. . , just because (as we
have seen) there is a source of an infinite (or indefinitely
large) number of new ideas that can be thought of and, thus,
created (or discovered) and appropriated ex nihilo, merely
by hard (and creative) thought.... [When I privatize an
idea], the number available to you is not thereby decreased.... [Y]ou are not deprived, so long as you remain
able and willing to exert mental labor.... As it is with
patents, so it is with copyrights. . . All of these kinds of
property share the characteristicthat, while I can exclude you
from the use of mine, there is not thereby a smaller amount
upon which you can draw to use or own."5
According to the ex nihilo conception of the creative process, creators create
not so much by building upon pre-existing elements of others' works or by
making transformative uses of pre-existing works, but by exerting mental
labor to create ex nihilo. On this conception of the creative process, even
though intellectual property is excludable, unlimited rights in intellectual
property present no difficulties from the perspective of justice between
creators because broad intellectual property rights for earlier creators do not
impinge upon the rights of subsequent creators-who can create by exerting
mental labor and who can generate the relevant raw materials of the creative
process ex nihilo. If and to the extent that the parties deliberating in the
initial choice situation were to take as their starting place an ex nihilo
conception of the creative process, in which the act of creation does not
necessarily involve the incorporation of elements of pre-existing works, then

something more than nothing) the components of the creative process are practically infinite in number,
such that my exclusive ownership of a component of the creative process would not in any way impair
your ability to create. AL
" See Child, supranote 84, at 68-69.
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limitations on authors' rights in creative works would not necessarily be
warranted.
In contrast, under the recombinative conception, the creative process is
conceptualized as one in which creators create through a process by which
they are inspired by, build upon, and recast elements of preexisting works
of authorship, and make transformative and productive uses of such preexisting works. As Jessica Litman, an exponent of the recombinative
conception of the creative process, puts it:
[T]he very act of authorship in any medium is more akin to
translation and recombination than it is to creating Aphrodite from the foam of the sea. Composers recombine sounds
they have heard before; playwrights base their characters on
bits and pieces drawn from real human beings and other
playwrights' characters; novelists draw their plots from lives
and other plots within their experience; software writers use
the logic they find in other software;... cinematographers,
actors, choreographers, architects, and sculptors all engage
in the process of adapting, transforming, and recombining
what is already 'out there' in some other form. This ... is
the essence of authorship.86
Wendy Gordon, also an exponent of the recombinative conception of the
creative process, contends that recombination is the essence of the technological as well as the artistic process of creation and intellectual advancement:
New creators inevitably and usefully build on predecessors.
In her invention of techniques, discoveries, ideas, or themes,
the new creator speaks out of a history, and the very value
of her contribution will depend upon her advancing upon
what has come before. The inventor of the automobile
builds on one predecessor's invention of metal-smelting
processes, another predecessor's invention of gears, another
predecessor's invention of the wheel, and ultimately on the

86 Jessica Litnan, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 965-66 (1990). See also Wendy Gordon,
A PropertyRight in SelfExpression:Equality andIndividualism in the NaturalLaw ofintellectualProperty,
102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1556 (1993).
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efforts of some Promethean cave-dweller who, in discovering how to make fire, laid the groundwork for the internal
combustion engine. The pattern is not limited to technological culture. Artists learn from predecessors the laws of
perspective, the uses of oils, acrylics, and watercolors, and
the very traditions that give meaning to their productions.
As for music, it is often argued that there is a limited
vocabulary available for musical composition, and that
composers will inevitably and necessarily work in a received
tradition, as well as re-use prior themes. Communication
depends on a common language and common experience."
Adoption of the recombinative conception of the creative process in turn
requires that certain components of pre-existing creative works be preserved
unowned for the benefit of future prospective authors so that they can build
upon such components in creating their own works. In the oft-quoted
words of Zechariah Chafee:
The world goes ahead because each of us builds on the work
of our predecessors. A dwarf standing on the shoulders of
a giant can see farther than the giant himself. Progress
would be stifled if the author had a complete monopoly on
everything [in his work for the entire copyright term or for
an unlimited term]. Some use of its contents must be
permitted in connection with the independent creation of
other authors. The very policy which leads the law to
encourage his creativeness also justifies facilitating the
creativeness of others.88

'7 Gordon, supra note 86, at 1556. Further examples of theorists who argue in favor of or who
presume a recombinative conception of the creative process are manifold. See, e-g., RICHARD A. POSNER,
LAW AND LrrERATURE 403 (1988) ("The literary imagination... is not a volcano of pure inspiration but
a weaving of the author's experience of life into an existing literary tradition.*). See also Dworkin, supra
note 74, at 156 ("We must have a tradition of innovation and we must have particular forms of art
sufficiently open-ended and amenable to interpretation so that continuity can be preserved through
innovation .... ').
. " Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright,45 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 533 (1945). See
also BENJAMIN KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 2 (1967) (Trogress, if it is not entirely
an illusion, depends upon a generous indulgence of copying.").
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In short, the adoption of one conception of the creative process over the
other has significant implications for structuring a system of rights and
privileges in creative works. If and to the extent that the parties deliberating
in the initial choice situation were to adopt an ex nihilo conception of the
creative process and conceptualize the creative process as one in which
authors create out of nothing, then it matters not from the standpoint of
justice between authors whether any limitations are imposed upon authors'
rights in their works or whether any savings of components or uses of such
works is required. If and to the extent that the deliberating parties were to
adopt a recombinative conception of the creative process, then the creative
process is conceptualized as one in which authors necessarily create by
building upon components of pre-existing creative works, and certain
elements and uses of creative works must be preserved for the benefit of
future authors through the imposition of limitations on authors' rights.
The issue of which conception more closely reflects the actual process of
creation is a complex and to some extent a circular one. It is certainly true
that much of Western art, literature, and science has benefited greatly from
a culture in which borrowing and "standing upon the shoulders" of one's
predecessors has been permitted and encouraged.89 Many at the forefront of
the technological revolution contend that their successes have resulted from
building upon the works of their predecessors.' Yet we could certainly
conceive of creative cultures in which borrowing from others' works is
discouraged or outright prohibited, or in which creation was conceptualized
as occurring-and therefore encouraged to occur-ex nihilo.
Adopting a Rawlsian construction of the initial choice situation, we can
assume that the deliberating parties are at least to some extent risk averse and
would therefore choose to minimize their worst possible outcomes upon
leaving the original position.9' Accordingly, the deliberating parties would
consider and weigh the possible outcomes of the decision to "save" versus the
decision not to save under circumstances in which they turned out to be

"To take an especially well-known example, Shakespeare is considered to be among the greatest
literary borrowers of all times, and not coincidentally, also among the most creative. See POSNER, supra
note 87, at 403, 396. My aim is not to answer the question of which conception of the creative process
most accurately reflects the creative process, but rather to explore the implications of the adoption of one
conception over the other for asystem of rights in creative works.
'* See BOYLE, supra note 81, at 165 (describing opposition of several prominent computer experts to
broad intellectual property rights in software).
" See RAWLS, suprm note 10, at 152-53.
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recombinative creators compared to circumstances in which they turned out
to be ex nihilo creators. In particular, they would evaluate two competing
outcomes: (1) the worst case outcome if, upon leaving the original position,
they turned out to be ex nihilo creators; and (2) the worst case outcome if,
upon leaving the original position, they turned out to be recombinative
creators who therefore needed to build upon the pre-existing works of earlier
creators. Uncertain about whether, upon exiting the initial choice situation,
they would become ex nihilo creators or recombinative creators, and facing
the decision of whether to save elements and uses of their creative works for
the benefit of subsequent creators, the parties would adopt the alternative the
worst outcome of which is superior to the worst outcome of the others
(which Rawls denominates the "maximin" principle)," Consistent with the
maximin principle, the deliberating parties would select some type of savings
principle, because the worst possible outcome of the decision to adopt a
savings principle with respect to creative works is superior to the worst
possible outcome of the decision not to save-in which creation is impossible
or severely impaired if upon leaving the original position an author turns out
to need to make use of pre-existing creative works in creating her own
works.
Having decided to minimize their worst possible outcomes upon leaving
the initial choice situation and to thereby adopt a savings principle of some
sort, the deliberating parties would then need to determine how broad or
narrow a savings principle to adopt with respect to creative works. In doing
so, they would need to agree on a path over time that treats all "generations"
of creators justly during the course of society's creative history."' In
particular, they would be charged with choosing a principle of savings that
they would want all previous authorial generations to have followed and
would want all future authorial generations to follow, no matter how far
backward or forward in time.94 Given these constraints on their decisionmaking, the deliberating parties would not credit an argument for extensive
and unlimited creative rights representing solely the interests of authors who
had already created their work and who sought to maximize their share of
wealth accruing from such creations, because the deliberating parties would
be required to agree ona savings principle in cultural materials that they

9'

d at 152-53.

9 Id. at 291.
' See RAWLS, supra note 27, at 274.
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would want all previous authorial generations to have followed." If previous
generations of authors had secured maximal rights for their works, then
pursuant to the recombinative conception of the creative process, presentday authors would be seriously impaired in their ability to create their own
works. Thus, the deliberating parties, taking into account the interests of all
creative generations, would agree to limits on the rights of all authors in
order to preserve the raw materials of the creative process for all authors,
regardless of when such authors arrived on the timeline of society.
4. TranslatingMandated Savings into Specific Limitations on Authors'
Rights. Having concluded that authors behind the veil of ignorance would
opt for some system of mandated savings in creative works, I next take up
the consideration of how such "savings" of creative works would translate
into limitations to be imposed on authors' rights. In this section, I contend
that parties deliberating in an initial choice situation who were concerned to
protect the interests of creators over time would include: (1) limitations on
the scope of rights in creative works, such that the fundamental raw
materials for subsequent authors' process of creation would remain available
to them; (2) limitations on authors' right to control transformative uses of
their works; (3) limitations on authors' right to control critical assessments
of their works; and, possibly (4) durational limitations on authors' rights in
their works. My analysis of the interests and incentives operating upon
authors in a Rawlsian initial choice situation supports limitations on authors'
rights that partially overlap with the limitations imposed on copyright rights,
as discussed in Part I. Yet, my analysis diverges from copyright law's
justifications for limiting rights in several ways. First, my analysis is rightsbased-focusing on the right of authors over time to create-whereas
copyright law's is predominantly utilitarian. Second, unlike mainstream
copyright theory, my analysis does not take into account the role of
transaction costs in justifying limitations on authors' rights.' Because my
analysis aims to justify limitations on creators' rights in the digital

" See, eg., Wendy Gordon, FairUse as Market Failure,82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) (contending
that the fair use doctrine in copyright law can be explained as a response to market breakdown between
earlier authors/would-be licensors and subsequent authors/would-be licensees).
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age-where relevant types of transaction costs are diminishing97-I rely upon
justifications other than transaction costs for limiting authors' rights. 98
a. Limitationson the Scope ofRights in Creative Works. Not knowing
which creative generation along the timeline of society they would belong,
authors deliberating in the original position would choose to preserve for
subsequent authors access to the raw materials and fundamentally "reusable"
elements of the creative process. Thus, for example, deliberating authors
would seek to preserve for subsequent authors reusable creative elements like
ideas and ideational elements-including stock characters, situations, plot
lines, etc.99-that could be reformulated and reincorporated into creative
works by subsequent authors. Even if it could truly be said that such ideas
and ideational elements were initially created by one particular historical
author, the deliberating parties, applying the principle of justice over time,
would opt to save such components for the benefit of future authors by
excluding such components from the scope of creators' rights in their works.
As Richard Posner contends with respect to the ideational elements
embodied in literary works:
[I]n order to pass the test of time... a [literary] work must
be relatively impervious to cultural change. It must therefore deal . . . with the recurrent problems of the human
condition-with the commonplaces of life, with stock
situations, stock characters, stock narratives... [As] ideas in
literature . . . comprise a quite limited stock of situations,
narratives,and charactertypes, to recognizeproperty rights in

See, ag., Robert P. Merges, The End ofFriction? PropertyRights andContract in the 'Newtonian'
World of On-Line Commerce, 2 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 115 (1997); Richard Alan Homing, Has Hal Signed
A Contract The Statute ofFrauds in Cyberspace,12 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 253,

256(1996).
" Cf WilliamM. Landes& Richard A. Posner, AnEconomicAnalysis ofCopyrigbtLaw, 18J. LEGAL
STUD. 325 (1989) (arguing that authors, from an ex ante position, would opt for certain types of
limitations on their rights because of the high transactions costs associated with consensual bargains in
certain circumstances).
Although, for simplicity, I rely primarily on literary examples, the importance of preserving ideas
embodied in creative works applies as well to technological works of authorship, such as software
programs, which contain such ideational elements as algorithms and basic procedures which other
software developers arguably need to recombine and recast in creating their own works. See, eg., Whelan
v. Jaslow, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986); Computer Associates v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
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them would... deplete the stock of literary raw material
availablefor later writers withoutfee.'"

Of course, forging the line between non-privatizable ideational elements and
other, privatizable elements of creative works will be an intricate task. In
drawing the relevant lines, parties should generally be guided by the
recombinative conception of the creative process, and should ensure that
rights in creative works are designed such that later authors have access to
certain fundamental components of the creative process.
b. LimitationsFacilitatingSubsequent TransformativeUses of Creative
Works. In translating the principle of justice over time into limitations on
authors' rights in their creative works, authors deliberating in an initial
choice situation might also opt to preserve for later authors the right to make
certain uses of non-ideational elements of prior creative works. For certain
types of (subsequent) creative works-including inherently referential works
like biographies, histories, and journalistic works, the right merely to build
upon the ideational elements of prior works would be insufficient to secure
the subsequent author's ability to create." 1 Creators of such essentially
referential works would likely need to be able to incorporate elements
beyond the ideas embodied in pre-existing works-such as direct quotations
and paraphrases from prior works-in order to create their own works.0 2
In accurately painting the history of a particular period, the historian may
need to quote or copy directly from prior creative works in creating her own
transformative work. Thus, a just savings principle for creative works that
merely entitled authors to incorporate ideational elements from pre-existing
works would be insufficient to protect subsequent authors' ability to create
inherently referential works. In order to ensure that subsequent authors of
referential works are able to exercise their right to create, authors deliberat-

'

POSNER, supra note 87, at 393-94 (emphasis added).

t01 See, e.g., Pierre Leval, Touiarda Fair Use Standard,103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111-16 (1990).
For example, in the case of New Era Publ'n Int'l v. Henry Holt and Co., the author of a biography
of L. Ron Hubbard, founder of the Church of Scientology, sought to establish that Hubbard was
dishonest, cruel, and bigoted (among other things). In order to do so effectively, the biographer claimed
that she needed to make use of actual quotations of Hubbard (taken from copyrighted works) in writing
her biography. See New Era Publ'n Int'l v. Henry Holt & Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), affid
on other grounds, 873 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1989). Similarly, in the case of Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953
F.3d 731 (2d Cir. 1991), the author of a biography Richard Wright claimed that it was necessary for her
to quote and paraphrase material from Wright's journals and letters (which were protected by copyright)
in creating the biography.
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ing in the initial choice situation would opt to impose limitations on authors'
rights to exercise exclusive control over such subsequent transformative uses
of their own works.
c. LimitationsFacilitatingSubsequent Evaluationsof Creative Works.
Thirdly, authors deliberating in the initial choice situation might opt to limit
authors' rights so as to permit evaluative uses of authors' works, even where
such evaluative uses have the effect of harming the market for a particular
author's work. Although this category of uses might be subsumed within
the above category of transformative uses (for example, in the case of
parodies), it is worth considering such uses separately because of the unique
barriers such uses impose to consensual bargaining between earlier authors
and subsequent authors. While earlier authors might consent to or license
for a fee certain transformative uses of their works, it is unlikely that they
would voluntarily permit critical, evaluative uses to be made of their works.
In choosing between a rule that prohibited evaluative, critical uses and a rule
that privileged such uses, the deliberating parties would consider the benefits
that evaluative uses provide to authors as a class, including by enabling them
to rely upon such unbiased evaluations in determining which works to build
upon in creating their own works. Recognizing that such evaluative uses
tend to benefit authors as a class because they encourage consumer confidence in works of authorship, the deliberating parties would permit such
uses and would limit all authors' rights accordingly.
d. DurationalLimits on Rights in Creative Works. It may often be
difficult to draw the line between those elements and uses of works that are
properly within an author's exclusive rights pursuant to the analysis from
the perspective of justice between authors, and those that are outside the
scope of an author's exclusive rights. To account for the possibility that such
lines may be drawn in a manner insufficiently protective of future authors'
creative rights, deliberating parties might opt to impose brightline durational
limits on authors' rights as a type of fail-safe mechanism. Such durational
limitations would ensure that, at some point, all elements and uses of creative
works would be freely available for subsequent authors to use in creating
their own works. If, for example, the plot lines of star-crossed lovers or
desperate starving artists were somehow (erroneously) determined to fall
within an author's exclusive rights so that the first author embodying such
plot lines could exercise exclusive rights with respect to them, the imposition
of the fail-safe of durational limitations on such rights would ensure that
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future authors at some point would be permitted to incorporate such
ideational elements into their own works.
Yet even if the lines demarcating authors' exclusive rights were known to
be drawn perfectly in every case, the deliberating parties might still opt to
impose durational limits on creative rights, on the grounds that certain prior
works may become so integral to the creative vocabulary that subsequent
creators must be permitted to make use of them in their entirety in creating
their own works. The authors deliberating in the initial choice situation
might opt to protect subsequent authors' right to make extensive use of prior
creative works that have become so deeply embedded within a society's
cultural framework as to become integral to other authors' ability to create.
Deliberating parties might therefore choose to structure the system of
authors' rights so as to allow authors after a period of time to freely and fully
incorporate and build upon works like Homer's Odyssey, 3 Shakespeare's
Romeo andJuliet,1 °' Mozart's Marriage of Figaro,05 or Virginia Woolf's Mrs.
Dalloway,l in creating their own transformative works.
In short, authors deliberating behind a veil of ignorance that obscured
from them information as to when along the timeline of society they would
be creating would opt for limitations on authors' rights that would preserve
for subsequent authors the ability to fully exercise their creative rights. Such
limitations would likely protect for subsequent authors the ability to
incorporate ideational elements from earlier works, to make transformative
and evaluative uses of earlier works, and to make full and free use of all
earlier works after a certain period of time.
B. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF JUST SAVINGS OF CREATIVE WORKS

The economic analysis of copyright law set forth by William Landes and
Richard Posner, 107 while emanating out of a utilitarian tradition quite

1 Twentieth Century Irish author James Joyce built extensively upon Homer's Odyssey in creating
Ulysses, one of the greatest works of the past century.
"0Many authors have built upon the story of Romeo and Juliet, including Arthur Laurents in his
creation of West Side Story, which was set to music by Leonard Bernstein.
105 Famous contemporary director/producer Peter Sellars has transformed several Mozart operas using
modern sets and characterizations, including TbeMarriage ofFigaro.
106 MichaelCunningham's wonderful recent novel TheHoursisclosely based on Virginia Woolf's
Mrs.
Dalloway.
101 Landes & Posner, supra note 98, at 325.
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different from the Rawlsian rights-based framework pursued above, t s
provides some helpful guidance in analyzing the contours of the savings
principle that would be chosen by authors behind the veil of ignorance.
Consistent with Rawls' principal goal in A Theory of Justice of advancing
justice as fairness as an alternative to utilitarian theories of distributive
justice, Rawls contends that the parties deliberating in the original position
would reject a utilitarian principle for guiding their decisions regarding the
distribution of the benefits and burdens of societal cooperation and would
adopt his two principles of justice instead.'O In this section, however, I
consider what flows from an initial choice situation where the parties were
guided by a principle of utility in their deliberations regarding the nature and
scope of rights in creative works.
In their economic analysis of copyright law, ' Landes and Posner explore
the tensions between (1)the interests of earlier authors-i.e., those who have
already created their works-in expanding their rights, and (2)the interests
of future authors-i.e., those who have not yet created their works-in
limiting the rights of the authors who come before them. Landes and Posner
consider the conflicting motivations and preferences at work among different
generations of authors regarding the scope of rights in creative works.
Assuming that the process of creation is essentially recombinative in
nature,"' Landes and Posner claim that where rights in creative works are
limited, subsequent authors can more cheaply and easily borrow from preexisting works. The cost of creation for later authors is accordingly lower
under a regime in which authors' rights in their creative works are limited.' 1
On the other hand, in a regime of unlimited, extensive property rights in
creative works, in which all copying of such works is prohibited, the cost of

' Rawls himself explores the possible implications of the deliberating parties selecting a utilitarian
principle, instead of the two principles of justice, as the foundational principle in the original position.
See RAWLS, supra note 10, at 161-75.
109 Id.
Io

Landes and Posner contend:

creating a new work typically involves borrowing or building upon material from
a prior body of works, as well as adding original expression to it. A new work of
fiction, for example, will contain the author's expressive contribution but also
characters, situations, plot details, and so on, invented by previous authors.
Landes & Posner, supra note 98, at 332.
111

d
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creating new works is. higher and the number of future works created will
likely be lower."' As Posner contends in his treatise Law and Literature,
The more extensive copyright protection is, the more
inhibited is the literary imagination. . . The works of
previous writers are inputs into current work, and these
inputs get more expensive the more those earlier works are
protected by copyright. If every author of an epic poem had
to pay royalties to Homer's heirs, then Virgil, Dante,
Ariosto, Milton, Pope, Goethe, and others would have had
to incur an additional expense to write their epics [and
therefore may not have created such works].'
In their economic analysis of copyright law, Landes and Posner suggest that,
in designing a system of rights and limitations on rights in creative works,
authors as a class would approach the question of the scope of rights in
creative works from the ex ante position by taking into account two
different perspectives: (1) the perspective of the present (or "earlier")
generation of authors, who have the incentive to limit the extent to which
creative works can be mined as source material for other works; and (2) the
perspective of future authors, who wish to borrow from pre-existing works
in order to create their own works and who therefore prefer limited rights
in creative works.'14 Approaching the issue of the scope of rights in creative

1

hi See also POSNER, supra note 87, at 391 ('Shakespeare would have had to work harder, and so

might have written fewer plays, had he not been able to copy gratis from works of history and
literature ....
*).
'D l at 403, 396. Posner's analysis is echoed by Wendy Gordon, who argues similarly that the
enforcement of limitations on the creative rights of (earlier) authors is necessary to ensure that later
authors will have the full and fair opportunity to create:
One cannot assume that early creators or their heirs would consent to the use of
property by others to create new intellectual products if the first creators had control
of these necessary prior resources. [While some owners might consent to uncompensated or reasonably compensated use,] others might refuse to sell altogether or charge
more than the new creators can afford. More significantly, the cost of tracing
ownership and effecting transactions could itself be prohibitive. . . . Thus, if
perpetual property existed in all intangibles, many creators would have to choose
between using someone else's property without permission, or forgoing creation of
their own. ... For new creators to flourish, they must be able to draw on an array
or prior creations that are not privately owned.

Gordon, supra note 86, at 1557.
11.

Landes & Posner, supra note 98, at 333.
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works solely from the first type of author's perspective, deliberating parties
would opt for extensive property rights in creative works, while introducing
the subsequent author's perspective into the analysis would counsel in favor
of limited property rights in creative works. As Landes and Posner explain:
Copyright holders might therefore find it in their selfinterest, ex ante, to limit copyright protection. To the
extent that a later author is free to borrow material from an
earlier one, the later's cost of expression is reduced; and,
from an ex ante viewpoint, every author is both an earlier
author from whom a later author might want to borrow
material and the later author himself. In the former role, he
desires maximum copyright protection for the works he
creates; in the latter, he prefers minimum protection for
works created earlier by others. In principle, there is a level
of copyright protection that balances these two competing
interests .... "'
As Landes and Posner suggest, the imposition of limitations on rights in
creative works serves the goal of advancing the creative process in both the
short run and the long run," 6 by requiring present-day authors to forgo the
profits they would earn if they enjoyed unlimited rights in their works, in
the interest of subsequent authors.
Landes and Posner's ex ante analysis of authors' interests and incentives
undertaken from an economic perspective justifies imposing limitations on
authors' rights, several of which coincide with the limitations justified by the
above Rawlsian rights-based analysis from the perspective of justice over
time. First, their economic analysis provides a rationale for declining to
extend property rights to the ideas underlying works of authorship:
"s Id at 333. Paralleling Rawls' analysis of the incentives operating upon earlier and later generations
in the original position, Landes and Posner explain that the first generation of authors, having no one to
borrow from, would have less incentive to strike the optimal balance than later ones, and that later
generations who expected to borrow less than they are borrowed from will prefer broader rights in their
works than those expecting to be net borrowers. However, Landes and Posner continue, "ex ante...
before anyone knows whether he is likely to be a net 'debtor' or 'creditor,' authors should be able to agree
on a level of copyright protection." Id at 333 n.13.
116 Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and The Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26 (1984)
(observing that the Supreme Court has attempted to take an ex ante analysis of the creative process with
respect to certain new technologies).
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Suppose our N authors did not know which would be the
first to come up with an idea that the other N-i authors
would use.... Since... the costs involved in coming up
with the kind of new idea normally embodied in an expressive work usually are low relative to the costs in time and
effort of expressing the idea,.., the N authors.., probably
would agree unanimously (or nearly so) to a rule that
protected expression but not ideas."1 7
Relying on a version of the hypothetical tripartite contract between
predecessor authors, present authors, and successor authors, Landes and
Posner's economic analysis provides a justification for fixing the scope of
property rights in works of authorship to exclude ideas and similar ideational
elements.
Similarly, Landes and Posner claim that, ex ante, authors would agree to
limitations on their rights necessary to ensure that subsequent authors could
make transformative uses of elements of earlier works as inputs to their own
works. In particular, they argue, subsequent authors will likely need to
make use of inputs from earlier works that are not ideas or ideational
elements, but yet are part of the raw materials from which such authors
would need to be able to draw. Because such transformative uses would
lower the cost of expression for all authors and would therefore tend to
increase the number of works created, such limitations would be justified
under Landes and Posner's economic analysis." '
Landes and Posner further suggest that ex ante, authors would agree to
limitations on their rights where necessary to allow subsequent authors to
make critical uses of earlier works, for purposes such as book reviews and
parodies." 9 They contend that authors ex ante would choose to impose
limitations on their exclusive rights necessary to allow for the production of
credible and unbiased reviews of their works, because such reviews facilitate
a reliable market in creative works, which in turn benefits authors as a
class.'
Finally, Landes and Posner contend that ex ante, authors would
agree to a limited term for authors' rights in their works. In balancing the

7

See Landes & Posner, supr note 98, at 347-48.

S Id at 360-61.

I Id at 358-60.
m Id at 358-60.
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increased income attributable to longer terms of protection against the
increased cost of expression for authors because of the diminished public
domain, authors ex ante would opt for a limited term of rights in their
works. 121

In sum, although Landes and Posner's economic analysis of copyright
rights grows out of a utilitarian tradition that contrasts with the rights-based
Rawlsian analysis of systems of creative rights, both analyses support limiting
authors' rights in several significant respects.
C. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO REQUIRING INTERGENERATIONAL SAVINGS
OF CREATIVE WORKS

In Parts I and I, I have argued that, deliberating behind a veil of
ignorance, where authors did not know which period along the timeline of
society they would be born, authors would agree to certain limitations on
their rights, which we can construe as requiring the "savings" of portions of
their works for the benefit of authors across time. In this section, I
anticipate and address some objections to my analysis of this principle of
justice across time and just savings with respect to creative works.
Richard Epstein, writing on the subject of intergenerational justice,
intergenerational savings, and property rights," contends that any requirement of savings imposed on the present generation for the benefit of future
generations is unnecessary and inefficient. While Landes and Posner's
economic analysis justifies the imposition of limitations on creators' rights
similar to those justified on an intergenerational justice analysis, Richard
Epstein's economic analysis suggests that no limitations on the present
generation's rights are justified in order to protect the interests of subsequent
generations. Epstein apparently would reject any system of mandated
intergenerational savings applied to property rights generally,' and would
rely solely on the market, and our genetic predisposition to save for our
immediate descendents, to ensure sufficient savings for future generations.

u' At at 361-62.

m Richard Epstein, justice Across the Generations, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1465 (1989).
Epstein would, however, carve out several exceptions for environmental and common pool

1

problems. Id at1489.
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In his article JusticeAcross the Generations,""Epstein first contends that
the pre-eminent contributors to the subject of justice between generations
"focu(s] too much on duty and too little on practice and incentive."12
Rejecting the Rawlsian approach of looking to the state to enforce the
obligations owed by earlier generations to subsequent ones, Epstein contends
that:
Coercion and duty can do little specifically to insure that the
next generation receives its "fair share" of human and
natural resources. If we continue along in an unreflective
state to create sound institutions for the present, the problem of future generations will pretty much take care of itself,
even if we do not develop some overarching policies of
taxation or investment that target future generations for
special consideration.... A classicalliberal regime of limited

government, low taxation, personal liberty, and private
property benefits future generationsmore than an alternative
regime that consciously enlists large government to restrain
liberty and to limit the present use ofpropertyfor the benefit of
future generations.2'
Epstein contends that in order to safeguard the interests of future generations, we can and should rely upon the natural and genetic pre-dispositions
of parents to save for the benefit of, and to otherwise act in the best interests
of, their children. Historically, Epstein contends, reliance on (and noninterference with) these natural predispositions has allowed future generations to receive benefits from past generations that "exceed the level of
transfers stipulated under any of the standard theories of justice between
12
generations." 1
Epstein, however, seems to acknowledge that this laissez-faire approach
to intergenerational savings may not suffice to generate the proper amount
of savings with respect to intellectualproperty. First, in shifting the focus of
his discussion from the subject of real property to intellectual property, he

U4

d

m Id at 1466.
' Id (emphasis added).
m Id at 1488.
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acknowledges the importance of the public domain traditionally carved out
by intellectual property law for the benefit of future creators. 12 Although
he does not specifically address the desirability of a private ordering regime
in which creators are able to create unlimited rights for themselves, he does
recognize the benefits that the existing public ordering regime provides to
subsequent generations of creators. 129 Furthermore, his reliance upon
parents' predisposition to save for the benefit of their children does not
apply, mutatisrutandis,to the relationships among successive "generations"
of creators. That is to say, although we might be justified in relying upon
Johann Sebastian Bach and Woodie Guthrie to set aside financial nest-eggs
for Johann Christian and Arlo, respectively, we would not be justified in
relying solely upon these parents' predispositions to limit their rights in their
creative works for the benefit of future generations of creators generally.
Thus, Epstein's analysis cannot justify reliance on a system of unlimited
rights in creative works-such as those increasingly made possible by
technological and contractual private ordering measures-to protect the
interests of future creators.
In sum, in Parts I and II, I have argued that the principle of justice across
time applied to systems of rights in creative works justifies imposing
limitations on authors' rights in creative works in order to protect the rights
of all authors. Whether applying Rawlsian deontological principles or
utilitarian principles of distributive justice, authors deliberating behind a veil
of ignorance that obscured from them information as to when along the
timeline of society they would create would opt for limited rights in creative
works and for the concomitant "savings" of portions of creative works for
the benefit of all authors.

2 See, e-g., id at 1488 ("There is... a huge body of intangibles properly regarded as part of the public
domain.") (emphasis added). He also specifically recognizes the importance of limiting the term of
property rights in creative works. Epstein writes that
the hard question with copyrights... concerns their ideal duration .... The tradeoff
is that longer periods of protection induce greater invention, but only at the cost of
more limited use over time. The trick is to minimize the sum of the two costs. If this
is done in present value terms, future generations will be well served by the regime
of property rights so created.
Id. at 1488.
wIdi
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IMI. LIMITATIONS HISTORICALLY IMPOSED BY COPYRIGHT

LAW ON RIGHTS IN CREATIVE WORKS
Copyright law grants rights to authors in order to advance its
constitutionally-mandated utilitarian purpose. 30 Property rights are granted
to authors not in reward for their labor, but in furtherance of copyright
law's utilitarian mandate of advancing the creative process for the general
public good. Utilitarian considerations dictate, however, that when the
rights granted to authors stand as an impediment to advancing the creative
process, such rights must be limited in order to achieve the greatest (creative)
good for the greatest number. Accordingly, copyright rights are always
contingent upon whether such rights continue to serve the ultimate societal
good of advancing the creative process. Consistent with its utilitarian
mandate, copyright law grants rights to authors in order to stimulate the
creative process, but limits those rights where necessary to avoid impeding
the creative process.
Although the limitations on authors' copyright rights have historically
been understood to advance copyright law's utilitarian purpose, such
limitations also constitute a form of mandated intergenerational savings
imposed on authors for the benefit of future authors. Although Congress
and the courts have not explicitly adverted to principles of justice between
authors in justifying limitations on creators' rights, such themes inhere in the
jurispru,dence of copyright limitations. In myriad circumstances in which
authors have sought to wield their exclusive rights in ways that would fail to
preserve the raw materials of the creative process for future authors to build
upon, copyright law has imposed significant limitations on authors' rights.
Because present authors acting in their own interests do not have sufficient
incentive to "save" for the benefit of future authors, copyright law has
traditionally mandated the savings of certain elements and uses of authors'
creative works for the benefit of future authors. Below I explore the ways
in which copyright law's limitations on authors' rights both advance the
utilitarian purpose of promoting the creative process for the greater public
good and enforce obligations of justice between authors across time.

130 The Constitution empowers Congress to enact copyright and patent statutes "to promote the
progress of science and the useful arts." U.S. CONST., art. I, S8, ci. 8.
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First, an author's copyright monopoly lasts only for a limited time,"' in
accordance with the constitutional mandate of a limited copyright term.'
Thus, in contrast to real property rights, intellectual property rights in
creative works are constitutionally required to be of limited duration.
Second, copyright protection is only available for certain types of works and
certain elements within such works.' Finally, certain uses of works that are
protected by copyright-even of the protectible elements of these works-fall
outside of a copyright holder's exclusive rights and are privileged as fair uses
of such works. 34 Below I briefly describe each of these limitations, which
have been explored elsewhere in the literature. 3 '
A. WORKS FOR WHICH THE COPYRIGHT TERM HAS EXPIRED

An important limitation on copyright rights is the durational limit
imposed by the term of copyright protection. 36 In accordance with the
explicit constitutional mandate in the Copyright Clause,"' property rights
in works of authorship are required to be of limited duration. Because of
such durational limits on copyright rights, works of authorship from the
Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and early Twentieth Centuries in their entireties are
within the "public domain" and can be freely used by subsequent authors.
Because such works are no longer protected by copyright, future authors can
make any and all uses of works such as Herman Melville's Moby Dick,
Charlie Chaplin's film The Tramp, or Mahler's Second Symphony. Although
the term of copyright protection has expanded dramatically over the past
two centuries, 3 ' the constitutionally-required limited term of copyright

u See 17 U.S.C. S 302(a).
m See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 140-52 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 153-64 and accompanying text.
"3 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965, 965-66 (1990); Wendy Gordon,
Fair Use as Market Failure,82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
"6 See 17 U.S.C. S 302(a).
"7 See U.S. CONST., art. I, S 8,cl. 8. (granting Congress the power 'to promote the progress of science
and the useful arts, by securingfor limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries") (emphasis added).
in Over the past centuries, this limited term has been extended from two years, to 14, to 21, to 28,
to 56, to life of the author plus 50 years, to its current length of life of the author plus 70 years for
individual authors. See NIMER ON COPYRIGHT, at 1.05(AII]. This recent twenty-year extension has
been challenged as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power under the Copyright Clause. See
Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. grantedsub nom. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S. Ct. 1062
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protection ensures that, at some point, earlier authors' works will pass into
the public domain where they can be freely and fully used by other authors
and incorporated into future creative works."'
B. UNPROTECTED ELEMENTS OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS

A second fundamental limitation imposed by copyright law on creators'
rights encompasses those elements of otherwise copyrightable works that are
excluded from the scope of an author's monopoly. In myriad court decisions
throughout the past centuries, courts have expressly withheld certain
elements of otherwise copyrightable works from the exclusive control of
authors. These unprotectable elements include primarily facts, 1 which are
not original to the author and are therefore not properly included as part of
a creator's rights qua creator, and ideas and ideational elements,'41
which-even if ostensibly created by the author-are deemed to fall outside
the scope of the author's monopoly under the judicially crafted
"idea/expression dichotomy." 42
In developing the idea/expression dichotomy, courts have attempted to
draw a boundary between the underlying ideas on which a work is based and
an author's particular expression of such ideas, and have held that the ideas
themselves-including such ideational elements as stock characters, general
themes, or plots4 ' contained within works-are not within the scope of the

(2002). In this lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension
Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998), Eric Eldred et al. contend that retroactive extension of
the term of copyright protection fails to "promote the progress of science and the useful arts" and is
therefore an unconstitutional exercise of Congress's power.
"' As Wendy Gordon contends, 'if perpetual property existed in all intangibles, many creators would
have to choose between using someone else's property without permission, or forgoing creation of their
own. ... For new creators to flourish, they must be able to draw on an array of prior creations that are
not privately owned." Gordon, supra note 86, at 1557. See also Edward C. Waltersheid, Defining the
Patentand Copyright Term: Term Limits and the Intellectual Property Clause, 7 J.INTELL. PROP. L. 315
(2000).
"0 See 17 U.S.C. S 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any... discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied in a work."); Feist v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
141 See 17 U.S.C. S 102(b) ("In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship
extend to any idea,... regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied
in a work.").
142 See, eg., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119,121 (2d Cir. 1930); ROBERTA. GORMAN
&JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETIES 96 (1981).
14 See, eg., Warner Bros. Pictures v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954) ("If the
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author's monopoly. Copyright law dictates that these latter components of
works of authorship be dedicated to the public domain and cannot be
rendered subject to the private control of any one author.'" Under the
doctrine of the idea/expression dichotomy, copyright law grants authors
monopoly rights in the expression of the ideas embodied in their works, but
withholds such monopoly protection from the underlying ideas
themselves. 4 Thus, for example, the copyright owner of the film Analyze
This may prohibit subsequent filmmakers from copying substantial portions
of scenes from the film or from appropriating detailed creative elements
from the film, but cannot prohibit subsequent creators from building upon

character is only the chessman in the game of telling the story, he isnot within the area of protection
afforded by the copyright"), cert.denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955); Nichols v.Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d
119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.) ("If Tu'efth Night were copyrighted, it is quite possible that a second
comer might so closely imitate Sir Toby Belch or Malvolio as to infringe, but it would not be enough that
for one of his characters he cast a riotous night who kept wassail to the discomfort of the household, or
a vain and foppish steward who becomes amorous of his mistress. These would be no more than
Shakespeare's "ideas" in the play [and not] capable of monopoly.").
" In addition to preserving the raw materials of the creative process in the public domain, the
idea/expression dichotomy also advances important First Amendment values. In particular, because
copyright law's idea/expression dichotomy prohibits authors from monopolizing the ideas embodied in
their works, copyright law ensures that members of the public are allowed to communicate freely and
build upon such ideas (so long as they do not appropriate the precise form in which the ideas were
conveyed by the original author). The Supreme Court has explained that "[clopyright's idea/expression
dichotomy strikes a definitional balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by
permitting free communication of [uncopyrightable material such as ideas and] facts, while still protecting
an author's expression." Harper & Row Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985).
Extending an author's exclusive rights to the ideas embodied in her work would frustrate the creative
enterprise, and impinge upon core First Amendment values by restricting the expression of ideas. Thus,
the idea/expression dichotomy ensures that the ideas embodied in copyrighted works can circulate freely,
while granting copyright owners the right to control their particular expression of their ideas. SeeJessica
Litman, Reforming Information Law in Copyright'sImage, 22 U. DAYTON L.REV. 587, 604 (1997). As
Neil Netanel explains in his discussion of the role of copyright in a democratic society, in order for
citizens to participate in a rich cultural, social, and political life, they must have wide latitude to express
and reformulate ideas embodied in copyrighted expression. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright in a
DemocraticCivilSociety, 106 YALE L.J. 283 (1996). See also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright
Within the FirstAmendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2001) (arguing that the First Amendment should
be construed to impose limits on the expansion of copyright rights). In the words of pragmatist
philosopher John Dewey, in order for citizens to formulate and articulate their interests and preferences
on public issues, they must "haveaccess to the rich store of the accumulated wealth of mankind in ideas,
knowledge, and purposes." JOHN DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION 52 (1963), quoted in
Netanel, Copyrightin a DemocraticCivil Society, supra, at 349 & n.302.
"'i
Significantly, if an idea can only be expressed in one or a limited number of ways, copyright law
resolves this issue of whether to extend protection to the idea and its expression in favor of the public, by
refusing to grant copyright protection to expression that "merges" with the idea it embodies. See, eg.,
Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458 (5th Cir. 1990).
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the idea of a Mafia boss experiencing panic attacks, seeking psychotherapy,
the warring Mafia clans' response, etc.'
Similarly, the owner of the
copyright in the film Star Wars can prohibit a subsequent filmmaker from
creating a movie that incorporates and free rides upon substantial creative
elements of Star Wars, but cannot lay exclusive claim to the idea of a movie
involving intergalactic battles. 47
Historically, the copyright statute did not specify which portions of
creative works fell within and which fell without the scope of an author's
monopoly.14 Yet, as copyright holders brought infringement actions
seeking to exercise broad exclusive rights in their works in order to prohibit
subsequent creators from building upon their works, the courts responded
by developing the idea/expression dichotomy. 49 Over the years, the courts
developed a jurisprudence of limitations on authors' rights by articulating
those aspects of copyrightable works that were properly subject to authors'
exclusive control and those that were not. Largely through the vehicle of the
idea/expression dichotomy, courts declined to allow authors to exercise
exclusive control over the broad outlines of their plots, themes, characters,
and literary devices.'The famous Learned Hand opinion of Nichols v. Universal Pictures1 '
illustrates the judicial role in curtailing authors' rights in order to protect the
interests of subsequent authors. The plaintiff in Nichols authored a play
entitled Abie's Irish Rose, involving a Jewish family and an Irish Catholic
family whose children fall in love, secretly marry, and raise a family.
Plaintiff alleged copyright infringement by the author of the subsequently
created play The Cohens and The Kellys, also involving a Jewish family and an
Irish Catholic family whose children fall in love, secretly marry, and raise a
family. Ruling on plaintiff's claim that his copyright was infringed because
defendant's play borrowed the above-described broad plot lines, themes, and
characters, Judge Learned Hand held that the elements appropriated by

"4 The critically-acclaimed Home Box Office (HBO) series The Sopranosis premised upon the same
basic characters and plot lines as Anabye This, but is afar superior work.
" See Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, 715 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1983).
1'*

Litman, supra note 136, at 978.

See, e.g., id ("When copyright owners brought lawsuits asserting broad claims of ownership, the
courts took on the task of defining the nature of the rights in the copyright bundle. In so doing, they
drew the contours of the public domain bit by bit.").
IsL at 978-92.
45 F.2d 119 (1930).
149
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defendant were not properly within the scope of plaintiff's copyright.
Rather, Judge Hand explained, such broad themes, stock characters,
situations and plots were all no more than plaintiff's ideas, broadly speaking,
which could not be privatized by plaintiff. Courts have also extended the
idea/expression dichotomy to other types of works of authorship, including
technological works such as software programs, and have held that only the
expression of ideas, but not the ideas embodied within the software, are
protectible by copyright."'
In short, Congress and the courts have carved out several ideational
components of copyrightable works and excluded these elements from the
scope of authors' rights, and have in the process rejected authors' attempts
to prohibit subsequent authors from building upon such components in
creating their own works.
C. FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS
Copyright law's fair use doctrine also imposes substantial limitations on
authors' rights. While an author's copyright monopoly allows her to
prohibit others from copying substantial portions of her work for competing
commercial purposes, copyright law does not confer upon her the right to
prevent others from copying her work (or portions thereof) for certain
transformative, critical, and educational uses, among others. Over the years,
in establishing the contours of the fair use doctrine, Congress and the
courts 5 ' have carved out a host of exceptions to the exclusive rights granted
to authors, including exceptions for subsequent uses such as "criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching... , scholarship, or research.""" In
applying a variation of the analysis of the interests and incentives operating
upon authors in the original position, courts have justified the fair use
doctrine on a theory of hypothetical or implied consent. In justifying the

See, e.g., Computer Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
In 1976, Congress codified in Section 107 of the Copyright Act the judge-made fair use doctrine.
See H.R. Rep. No. 101-514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1990).
'"
See 17 U.S.C. S 107. The Copyright Act also recognizes that the public interest warrants
exceptions to authors' copyright monopolies in a number of areas that do not come under the aegis of the
fair use doctrine. See 17 U.S.C. SS 111(d), 115, 118, 119, 122 (compulsory licenses for cable
retransmissions, phonorecords, public broadcasting, satellite retransmission); 17 U.S.C. S 105 (exclusion
of copyright protection for government works); and 17 U.S.C. SS 108, 110, 121 (exemptions for library
photocopying, certain public performances, reproduction for the blind and disabled).
3
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limitations imposed on authors' rights by the fair use doctrine, for example,
the Supreme Court explained in Harper& Row that:
The author's consent to a reasonable use of his copyrighted
works has always been implied by the courts as a necessary
incident of the constitutional policy of promoting the
progress of science and the useful arts, since a prohibition of
such use would inhibit subsequent writers from attempting
to improve upon prior works and thusfrustrate the very ends
sought to be attained [i.e., the promotion of the progress of
science and the useful arts]155
The fair use doctrine thus "permits courts to avoid rigid application of [the
copyright holder's exclusive rights] when doing so... would stifle the very
creativity which that law is designed to foster."1 -6 Thus, under the fair use
doctrine, if I were writing a book about the treatment of the mafia by
Hollywood, I would likely be entitled under the fair use doctrine to
incorporate a portion of the dialogue from the film The Godfather. If I were
preparing a critical review or lampoon of Star Wars, I would be entitled to
incorporate several clips from the film into my review.
It will be helpful for my purposes to classify types of fair uses into the
following categories: (1) uses deemed fair because they are transformative
and productive; (2) uses deemed fair in order to overcome earlier authors'
desires to avoid criticism; and (3) uses deemed fair purely to overcome
logistical barriers to market formation. An example of the first is a
biographer's use of quotations from letters or journals written by the subject
of the biography."' The subsequent author's use of such quotations in
creating her own work is transformative and advances copyright law's goals
of promoting the creative process,"' despite the fact that the copyright
owner of the letters or journals might refuse to license their use. This
category of fair uses also encompasses more diffusely transformative uses,
like educational, research, and scientific uses, which ultimately tend to be

Harper&Row, 471 US. at 549 (emphasis added).
Iowa State Univ. Research Found. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980).
157 See, eg., Wright v. Warner Books, Inc., 953 F.2d 731 (2d Cir. 1991) (biographer of novelist Richard
"'

Wright enjoyed fair use privilege to copy portions of Wright's letters and journals in creating biography).
"

Id at 736 (holding that the biographer's copying of Wright's letters and journals furthers the goals

of the copyright laws by adding value to prior intellectual labor").
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transformative in that they lead to the promotion of the progress of science
and the useful arts. An example of the second category is the fair use
exception traditionally extended to works such as critical reviews and
parodies that quote passages from the works they are criticizing. 9 Because
of the author's endemic refusal to license certain types of works that would
reflect negatively upon her work-despite the fact that the subsequent use
would advance the societal interest in the creative process-the fair use
doctrine steps in to compel a (royalty-free) license between the author of the
earlier work and the author of the subsequent work."6
An example of the third category of fair uses includes those types of uses
that would likely be licensed if the earlier and later authors were brought to
the bargaining table and negotiations over the terms of the use were
facilitated. For example, if a commercial lecturer wished to prepare a
handout that included a reproduction of one paragraph from an obscure but
copyright-protected journal, and if despite her efforts, the lecturer were
unable to locate and secure permission from the copyright owner for such
use, the fair use doctrine might be interpreted to permit such use.16 ' Because
the lecturer's cost of transacting with the copyright owner over permission
62
to reproduce the paragraph would likely exceed the benefits of transacting,1
in the absence of a privilege, such use would not go forward and society as
a whole would be worse off. The fair use doctrine incorporates recognition
of the fact that, because of such logistical impediments to negotiation and
bargaining over such uses, unless such socially valuable subsequent uses were
privileged, they would likely not take place. This third category of fair use
thus reflects a fact about the state of the world in which transacting over

1s9 See, eg., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 592 (1994) (holding that 2 Live
Crew's
claimed fair use privilege to create rap parody of Roy Orbison song Oh, Pretty Woman was not defeated
by rap version's commercial nature, and observing the "unlikelihood that creators of imaginative works
will license critical reviews or lampoons" of their works); Suntrust v. Houghton Mifflin, 268 F.3d 1257
(11th Cir. 2001) (holding that publication of The Wind Done Gone, a parodic sequel to Gone With the
Wind, would likely be entitled to a fair use and a First Amendment defense and that therefore the district
court's grant of a preliminary injunction enjoining publication of the parodic novel was improper).
" As Wendy Gordon describes this category of fair uses, "[b]ecause the [author's] antidissemination
motives make licensing unavailable in the consensual market, and because the free flow of information
is at stake, a strong case for fair use can be advanced in these cases." Gordon, supra note 135, at 1633.
" Cf. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that
reproductions of pages of journals for which photocopying license was readily available via Copyright
Clearance Center was not fair use, but observing that "a particular unauthorized use should be considered
'more fair' when there is no ready market or means to pay for the use").
1,, See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, When is ParodyFairUse?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 69 (1992).
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non-substantial uses of prior works is often prohibitively expensive and timeconsuming. The difference between the result reached by the fair use
doctrine and that which likely would have been reached by an agreement
between the parties is, of course, the absence of a licensing fee. Because this
last category of fair uses is dependent upon the presence of transactions costs
that impose logistical barriers to market formation-primarily the cost of
locating and negotiating with authors of prior creative works' 6 3-to the
extent that these types of transactions costs are reduced in the digital realm,1"
the justifications for this type of fair use may not survive the migration of
creative works to the digital realm.
In short, copyright law imposes significant limitations on authors'
exclusive rights in their works of authorship. By means of limitations on the
term and scope of copyright protection, and the exceptions to authors'
copyright monopoly carved out by the fair use doctrine, copyright law
preserves for future authors the raw materials necessary to facilitate the
creative enterprise in the long run. While protecting the ultimate harvest of
an author's creative efforts, copyright law also protects "the seed and the
substance of this harvest."16 Although the limitations on authors' rights are
imposed primarily to advance copyright law's utilitarian purpose, these
limitations also serve to mandate the savings of creative works for the benefit
of future authors and thus also promote justice between authors and the just
savings of creative works.
IV. PRIVATE ORDERING OF RIGHTS IN CREATIVE WORKS

The balance between rights granted to authors and the limitations on
those rights traditionally embodied in copyright law is currently experiencing a tectonic shift, driven by forces from within and without copyright law.
From within, copyright law was recently amended to provide a new type of
right to copyright holders and to restructure the rights and privileges
historically enjoyed by creators and members of the public. The Digital
Millennium Copyright Act" recognizes the right of authors to privately
order their creative rights and to privately enforce these rights by means of

"'

See, eg., Gordon, supra note 135, at 1608-09.
See, ag., Merges, supra note 97, at130.
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985).

'"

Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860, S I (short title).

163
164
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technological measures-such as encryption and password controls-that

control access to and copying of works. The Digital Millennium Copyright
Act (DMCA) also grants authors the right to enforce these rights through the
judicial system, should their private enforcement mechanisms fail."' One
important creative industry-the major motion picture industry-has begun
to exploit its new rights under the DMCA and to employ technology to
prohibit all unauthorized access to and copying of motion pictures released
in DVD format.'" Reeling from its battles with Napster, the music industry
is also using access and copy control technologies to prevent digital music
files from being copied." Manufacturers of e-books and e-book readers are
also using access and copy control technologies to prevent the contents of ebooks from being copied." By using technological measures to prohibit
unauthorized access to and copying of their works, these copyright owners
are curtailing the privileges historically enjoyed by members of the public
under copyright law, as discussed below.
The historical balance between authors' rights and the limitations on
these rights is also undergoing a substantial shift set into motion by forces
outside copyright law in the form of major revisions in the contract law
regime governing the licensing of electronic works. Authors of such works

See 17 U.S.C. 5 1203 and 1204, providing civil and criminal penalties for circumvention of
technological measures.

i" See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), a4fdsub
nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001), amended by 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12548 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17,2001).
1 The recent dispute between the recording industry and computer science professor Edward Felten
involved the recording industry's attempts to use encryption technology-and ultimately the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act-to secure digital music files. In his lawsuit against the Recording Industry
Association of America et al., Professor Felten sought a declaration that he had a First Amendment right
to discuss the weaknesses in such encryption technology and that the application of the DMCA to prevent
him from discussing the same would be unconstitutional. The court refused to enter a declaratory
judgment in Felten's favor, holding that the dispute presented no real case or controversy. See Final
Hearing Transcript, Felten v. RIAA (Nov. 28, 2001), available at http://www.eff.org/Cases/
Feltenav...RIAA/20011128..hearing.transcript.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2002). Consumers are also
threatening lawsuits against the recording industry for distributing copy-protected CDs with inadequate
notice to consumers of the curtailment of their fair use privileges. See DeLise v. Fahrenheit Entm't Inc.
Complaint, availableat http://www.techfirm.com/mccomp.pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2002).
' The criminal indictment under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of Dmitry Sldyarov, a
Russian computer programmer, and the company for which he works, ElcomSoft, alleged that Sklyarov
and ElcomSoft trafficked in technology that could be used to defeat copy controls used in connection with
Adobe eBooks to prevent eBook readers from copying portions of these electronic books. See Sklyarov
Inldtmentaadableathttp://www.usdoj.gov/usao/can/press/assets/2applets/2001 08-28-skdyarov-jnd.
pdf (last visited Apr. 28, 2002).
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are now able to expand their copyright and copyright-like rights, while
contracting users' privileges, by means of contractual terms that bind all
those making use of such works.'' E-book authors are increasingly using
clickwrap licenses to create exclusive rights in their works, rights that admit
of no limitations analogous to those imposed by copyright law. In one of
the more extreme examples of private ordering in the digital realm,
Glassbook's e-book version of Lewis Carroll's classic Alice's Adventures in
Wonderland contained terms that prohibited the copying or printing of any
of the text or the reading aloud from the text.' Below, I explore both
technological and contractual private ordering mechanisms now available to
authors for circumventing the limitations traditionally imposed on authors'
rights under copyright law, as well as the consequences of such circumvention.
A. THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT AND THE PRIVATE
ORDERING OF RIGHTS IN CREATIVE WORKS

In the early years of the digital age, certain authors of digital works were
concerned that copyright law, as then constituted,' would not be up to the
task of controlling illegal copying of their works. These authors feared that,
because of the ease with which copies could be made of digital works,
copyright law would be ineffectual in controlling the widespread and near
instantaneous copying of their works. 7 ' One proffered solution to such
problems was to enable authors to take matters into their own hands by the
use of technological measures to control unauthorized access to and copying
of their works in digital form, and to have their right to use such technological measures protected by law. These interests prevailed both in the national
forum, as reflected in by the Clinton Administration's 1995 NIl White
Paper,174 as well as in the international forum, in the 1996 World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) Copyright Treaty.175 To implement the

11
17
"

See inta notes 223-44 and accompanying text.

See http://www.pigdogs.org/art/adobe.html (visited Apr. 28, 2002).
See, eg., William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., A Frameuworkfor Global Electronic Commerce

(1995).
174

I

The WIPO Copyright Treaty requires complying countries to afford 'adequate legal protection
and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of effective technological measures that are used by
authors in connection with the exercise of their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention .... *
'""
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United States' obligations under the WIPO Copyright Treaty, in 1998
Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, thereby enacting the
"most sweeping revisions ever"'76 to the Copyright Act of 1976.
1. DMCA and the Private OrderingofAccess Controlsand Copy Controls.
Title I of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act essentially recognizes
authors' rights to use technological measures to establish and enforce the
terms on which their works can be accessed and copied (if at all), thereby
countenancing authors' ability to privately order their rights in their works.
The DMCA also grants authors the right to seek judicial recourse when and
if their technological protection measures are compromised. And in
enforcing authors' new "paracopyright" right against circumvention of access
control measures, courts are not permitted to take into account the
traditional limitations on authors' rights imposed by the fair use doctrine
under Section 107 of the Copyright Act.'" DMCA thereby creates a new
copyright-like right for authors-the right to technologically control access
to their work and to prohibit circumvention of such technologies-and
exempts this right from certain limitations traditionally imposed on authors'
rights for the benefit of future authors.
In analyzing the operation of the provisions embodied in Section 1201 of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, it will first be helpful to explore the
distinction set forth in this section between what we may call "access
control" devices' 78 and "copy control" devices. 1 An access control device is
a device, such as an encryption or password system, that controls access to
a copyrighted work. For example, the owner of the copyright in a motion

WIPO Copyright Treaty, April 12, 1997, Art. 12, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17 (1997).
'7 David Nimmer, A Riffon FairUse in theDigitalMillenniumCopyrigbtAct,148 U. PA. L. REV. 673,
674 (2000).
' See, eg., Nimmer, supra note 176, at 739; Corley, 273 F.3d at 444.
' See 17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(3)(B) (A "technological measure 'effectively controls access to a work' if the
measure in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the application of information, or a process or

a treatment, with the authority of the copyright owner, to gain access to the work") (emphasis added).
'7 SeeS 1202(b)(2)(B) (A "technological measure'effectively protects aright ofacopyrightownerunder
this tide' if the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, prevents, restricts, or otherwise limits the
exercise of a right of acopyright owner under this title") (emphasis added). By its terms, this definition
isnot restricted to copy control devices; rather, it extends to measures that protect any of the copyright
holder's exclusive rights, including the right to copy, adapt, distribute to the public, or publicly perform
or display. Some have argued that this definition incorporates fair use limitations, because the rights of
a copyright owner, as set forth in Section 106, are expressly made subject to the limitations set forth in
Section 107, Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Fair Use. See Jane C. Ginsburg, CopyrightLegislationfor
the 'DigitalMillennium," 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 152 (1999).
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picture might release the film for home viewing only on DVD and prohibit
unauthorized access to the film stored on DVD by means of encryption
technology.18 Or, the author of a novel might release it only in electronic
form via the Internet and control access to the book by means of password
controls or encryptian technology."' Both types of controls would be
considered technological measures that effectively control access to a work,182
or "access control devices" for short. A copy control device is a device that
restricts the reproduction of works protected by copyright 8 (or which
restricts the unauthorized exercise of another of the author's exclusive
copyright rights).184 For example, the copyright owner of a film might
release the film on DVD and use encryption or other technological measures
to prohibit the copying of any part of the film.' Such technology would be
considered a technological measure that effectively protects the reproduction
right of the copyright owner, or a "copy control" device for short. Section
1201 prohibits both (1) the circumvention of access control devices
protecting a work, and (2) the making available to the public (and/or other
types of "trafficking in") devices designed either to circumvent access
controls or copy controls. Section 1201 prohibits three types of conduct:
(1) circumventing an access control device protecting a copyrighted work;'86

t' See, eg., Corley, 273 F.3d at 434-35.
181 See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
1u See 17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(3)(B).
"' As explained infra, Section 1201 prohibits both the circumvention of technological measures
controlling access to copyrighted works and technological measures prohibiting copying of copyrighted
works.
18 See 17 U.S.C. S 1201(b)(2)(B).
s See Corley, 273 F.3d at 434-35.
iM 17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(1) provides that "No person shall circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title." Notably, Section 1201 does not prohibit
circumventing a copy controldevice protecting a copyrighted work.
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(2) "trafficking in" devices primarily designed to circumvent accesscontrols;18 7
(3) "trafficking in" devices primarily designed to circumvent copy controls.88
As an example of access and copy control devices used by authors to
privately order their rights in their works, consider the measures recently
taken by the motion picture industry in conjunction with distributing their
films on DVD. Electing not to rely solely on copyright law's traditional
prohibitions on unauthorized reproduction, public distribution and display,
etc., of works of authorship, the industry supplemented its copyright rights
with technological measures prohibiting unauthorized access to and copying
of all or any part of their films distributed on DVD. "9 In making their films
available on DVD, the motion picture distributors employed an encryptionbased access control and copy prevention system, known as the Contents
Scramble System (CSS), to control access to and prohibit the copying of all
or any part of films distributed on DVD.'9 When the CSS was subsequently

17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(2) provides that:
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a
technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under
this title;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work
protected under this title; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with
that person's knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.
. 17 U.S.C. S 1201(b)(1) provides that
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise
traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing protection
afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright
owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively
protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion
thereof; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with
that person's knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded by a
technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under
this title in a work or a portion thereof.
'" Corley, 273 F.3d at 434-35.
'" As the district court explained, 'The application of CSS [the Contents Scramble System] to encrypt
a copyrighted motion picture ...prevents exact copying of either the video or the audio portion of all
or any part of the film." Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 322.
"u
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compromised by a decryption program known as DeCSS, the film distributors successfully brought suit under Section 1201 of the DMCA against those
who made DeCSS available to the public, in the case of Universal City
Studios v. Corley.191
The defendants in Corley claimed that the distribution of a program that
circumvented plaintiffs' access control and copy control devices was
necessary to enable members of the public to exercise the fair use privileges
they have historically enjoyed." Defendants contended that plaintiffs' use
of technological measures to assert unlimited exclusive rights in their works
was inconsistent with the limitations on rights historically imposed under
the Copyright Act. The Corley court held, however, that because plaintiffs
were not seeking vindication of their traditional-and traditionally
limited-copyright rights, but of their newly-created anti-circumvention
rights under Section 1201 of the Copyright Act, the fair use doctrine did not
serve to limit plaintiffs' rights in their works." Rejecting the argument that
the use of the DeCSS decryption program was necessary to enable members
of the public to exercise their fair use rights (or their First Amendment
rights) with respect to motion pictures stored in encrypted form on DVDs,
the court held that the fair use doctrine did not provide a defense to a Section
1201 violation.
As the Corley case demonstrates, authors can now employ technological
measures in exercise of their rights under the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act to prevent any and all copying of their works and to prohibit all but
paid and licensed access to such works. And authors who employ such
technological measures are entitled under Section 1201 to call upon the
courts to protect their privately ordered rights when their technological
measures of doing so fail. As scenarios like that presented in the Corley case
become more and more common, the issue is squarely raised of the
continued significance of and need for the limitations that copyright law has
historically imposed on authors' rights. Although Congress may have
intended, in passing the DMCA, to "extend[ ] into the digital environment
the bedrock principle of 'balance' in American intellectual property law for

"g

Corle'y, 273 F.3d 429.

19

Id

193 id
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the benefit of both copyright owners and users,"194 it is far from clear that
this intention was effectuated.

2. The DigitalMillennium CopyrightAct and The Fair Use Doctrine. An
analysis of whether and how well the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
extends into the digital realm the fair use rights and other traditional
limitations on authors' exclusive rights is a complex one. In crafting the
DMCA's anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions and the
exceptions thereto, Congress undertook efforts to preserve some types of fair
uses for some types of communities in some types of works of authorship.
First, several narrowly-crafted exceptions are available to Section 120 1(a)(1)'s
provision barring circumvention of access controls for certain "formal fair
use communities."' For example, Section 1201 grants non-profit libraries,
archives, and educational institutions the right to circumvent access controls
on copyrighted works solely in order to-and only for as long as necessary
to-determine whether they wish to purchase a legitimate authorized copy
of the access-controlled work." This exemption is only available if the
access-controlled work is not reasonably available in another form. Thus,
if a library sought to determine whether to purchase a copy of Stephen
King's latest novel released in encrypted form on his web site, the library
could lawfully circumvent such encryption access controls for so long as it
took to determine whether it wished to purchase an authorized copy of the
novel, only if the novel were not available in unprotected (hard copy)
format, and, importantly, only if the means for circumventing such access
controls were available to it. 9"
Second, Section 1201 grants users a right to circumvent access controls in
order to reverse engineer a computer program, solely in order to identify and
analyze the elements of the program necessary to achieve interoperability
with other programs.'
Individuals are also permitted to develop (and
"traffic in"'I technology to circumvent technological measures used to
reverse engineer computer programs in order to achieve interoperability. 2"

'"9

See Report of the House Comm. on Commerce, H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 25-26 (1998).

See Ginsburg, supra note 179, at153 (characterizing universities and libraries as "formal fair use

communities").
1%17 U.S.C.

S 1201(d).

197Id.
'"

17 U.S.C.
17 U.S.C.

S1201(Q.

S1201(0(2).

17 U.S.C. 5 1201(0(2), (3).
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Thus, in the special context of computer programs, users are granted the
privilege of circumventing access controls in order to access the
unprotectable ideas embedded within the computer programs, 1 and
developers are granted the privilege of developing technologies to enable
users to do so. Further, certain types of encryption research activities are
exempted from the reach of the anti-circumvention provision, and the
development of technology facilitating such research activities is exempted
from the reach of the anti-trafficking provision, 2 where such acts are
conducted to advance the state of knowledge in the field of encryption.0 3
In addition to providing the above narrowly-circumscribed fair use
exemptions in deference to formal fair use communities and in response to
scientific research and development needs, Congress also embedded a "failsafe" mechanism into Section 1201 with the intention of accommodating
on an ongoing basis the fair use rights of a broader range of communities.
Under this fail-safe mechanism, Section 1201(a)(1)'s prohibition on the
circumvention of access controls will not apply to "persons who are users of
a copyrighted work which is in a particular class of works, if [the Librarian
of Congress 205 determines that] such persons are, or are likely to be in the
succeeding [three year] period, adversely affected by virtue of [the anticircumvention] prohibition in their ability to make noninfringing uses of
that particular class of works .. .."2' That is, if the Librarian of Congress
determines that Section 1201's provisions prohibiting circumvention of
access controls have or will likely have an adverse effect on users' ability to
make non-infringing uses of a particular class of copyrighted works, the
Librarian can exempt that class of works from the reach of the anticircumvention provision for three years. 0 7 For example, if the Librarian of
Congress were to determine that users of audiovisual operatic works were
adversely affected by the anti-circumvention provision, the Librarian could
exempt this class of works from the provision's reach. Thus far, the

"' See Sega v. Accolade, 977 F.2d 1510, 1514, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1561, 1562 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that
use of copyrighted computer work to gain understanding of unprotected functional elements was fair use
of copyrighted work).
2
17 U.S.C. S 1201(g)(4).
2os17 U.S.C. S 1201(g).
See Nimmer, supra note 176, at 710.
The determination of the Librarian of Congress shall be made pursuant to a rule-making
proceeding as prescribed in Section 1201(a)(1)(C).
17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)(1)(B).
See 17 U.S.C. S 1201(a)()(D).
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Librarian has only exempted two very narrowly drawn classes of works from
the reach of the anti-circumvention provision.2 8 Thus, for the vast majority
of users and with respect to the vast majority of copyrighted works, no fair
use limitations apply to Section 1201's anti-circumvention provision. 20
Defenders of Section 1201's regime will note that this section only
prohibits circumventing access control devices and does not prohibit
circumventing copy control devices. If a user has or somehow gains access to
a work subject to copy controls, she is not prohibited by Section 1201 from
circumventing these copy controls-assuming she has a technological means
of doing so-in order to make fair use type copies of the work.
Furthermore, Section 1201 specifically recognizes that "nothing in this
section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright
infringement, including fair use, under this title."2 10 The Copyright Office,
in its summary of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,"' explains that the
absence of a direct prohibition on circumventing copy controls to parallel
the prohibition on circumventing access controls was intended "to assure
that the public will have the continued ability to make fair use of
copyrighted works. Since copying of a work may be a fair use under
appropriate circumstances, Section 1201 does not prohibit the act of
circumventing a technological measure that prevents copying."212 But, as
discussed below, the privilege of circumventing copy controls will likely ring
hollow: because the Act does prohibit trafficking in devices designed to
circumvent copy controls,"' it is likely that users will not have sufficient

- See 65 Fed. Reg. 64555 (Oct. 27,2000) (exempting (1) 'compilations consisting of lists of websites

blocked by fitering," and (2) "literary works, including computer programs and databases, protected by
access control mechanisms that fail to permit access because of malfunction, damage or obsoleteness*).
25

Furthermore, even with respect to works that are exempted under the fail-safe mechanism-i.e.,

works for which users are not prohibited from circumventing their access controls-it is not at all clear
that users will have any means at their disposal actually to circumvent the access controls guarding such

works. Recall that Section 1201 also prohibits the trafficking in devices circumventing access controls.
Because the trafficking in circumvention technology is prohibited by Section 1201(a)(2), access-control

defeating technologies will generally not be made available, so the exemptions granted by the Librarian
for certain types of works may be essentially meaningless. Furthermore, the trafficking in technology
specifically designed to circumvent access controls controlling only works falling within an exempted class
is not necessarily permitted under the statutory wording of Section 1201. See Nimmer, supra note 176,
at 735-77.
20 17 U.S.C. S 1201(c).
211 U.S. Copyright Office Summary, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998 (Dec. 1998).
21 l at 4.
" See 17 U.S.C. S 1201(b)(1).
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means available to them to circumvent such copy controls and to exercise
their privilege of making fair use copies.
To understand the effect of Section 1201's prohibitions, consider more
closely the use of the Contents Scramble System by motion picture
distributors to control unauthorized access to and copying of films released
on DVDs in the context of the following scenarios: (1)Scenario One: in
2002, several blockbuster hits are released only on DVDs protected by the
Contents Scramble System; (2)Scenario Two: the classic Charlie Chaplin
film The Tramp, which has fallen into the public domain, is released on CSSprotected DVD with a new (and copyright-protected 24) introduction; and (3)
Scenario Three: a never before released Charlie Chaplin film from 1922 is
released (with a new introduction) only on CSS-protected DVD. Below I
explore the effect of Section 1201's prohibitions on a hypothetical cinema
professor, Carla, who seeks to exercise her traditional fair use rights with
respect to the films in each of these scenarios.
With respect to Scenario One, Carla wishes to conduct a lecture on the
blockbuster hits of 2002, including those released only on DVD, and to
create an associated montage of relevant clips from such films. Is it possible,
as a technological and as a legal matter, for her to do so? First, although she
is not prohibited by Section 1201 from circumventing the DVD's copy
controls to copy portions of films stored on DVD, she is prohibited by
Section 1201(a)(1) from circumventing the DVD's access controls. Software
such as DeCSS which defeats the Contents Scramble System circumvents
both its access and copy controls;21 therefore, it is illegal to make such
technology available to the public under Sections 1201(a)(2) and 120 1(b)(1). 216
But let us suppose that Carla had a compliant DVD player and a legitimate
DVD of each film from which she wishes to copy in creating her montage,
so that she need not circumvent the CSS access controls. Would she be able
to defeat CSS's copy controls in order to make fair use copies of the
blockbuster films released only on DVD? As a legal matter, under 1201, the
answer is yes; Section 1201 does not prohibit the circumvention of copy
controls. As a practical matter, the answer is, probably not. In order to

214 See,

eg., Nimmer, supra note 176, at 712 ("Publishers are free to take old works that have fallen into

the public domain, to add a bit of original material to them and to claim a copyright in the newly-released

whole.").
215
216

See Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 308.
See id at 316 n.133.
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defeat CSS's copy controls and make a digital copy of portions of the films
stored on DVD, she would need some technological means of circumventing
these copy controls. But it is illegal to "traffic in" technology that
circumvents copy controls."'
If Carla cannot legally secure technology to circumvent CSS's copy
controls so as to make digital copies of portions of the films stored on DVD,
her only alternative for making fair use copies of the DVDs would be to
develop such circumvention technology herself. Recall that it is only a
violation to traffic in such copy-control defeating technology, not to use such
copy-control defeating technology (and presumably, not to create such
technology for one's own use). But it is highly unlikely that Carla and those
similarly situated will be able to develop such sophisticated encryption
technology-defeating technologies by themselves. Thus, the net effect of
Section 1201's prohibitions is to leave users like Carla who are not
technologically sophisticated enough to create their own circumvention
devices with no means of exercising their traditional fair use privileges with
respect to works protected by copy-control devices. As the district court
explained in ruling on the applicability of the fair use defense to defendant's
Section 1201 violation, in enacting the DMCA, "Congress elected to leave
technologically unsophisticated persons who wish to make fair use of
encrypted works without a means of doing so."218
It might be responded that Carla should not complain because and to the
extent that she can always make non-digital fair uses of the films released
exclusively on DVDs. For example, she could simply transcribe, or make an
analog audio copy from the speaker output of, the dialogue she wishes to
lecture on, or she could take a still picture or analog video tape of the

217 More precisely, it is illegal to traffic in any technology that

(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing protection
afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright
owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof;
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
circumvent protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively protects
a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof; or
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with
that person's knowledge for use in circumventing protection afforded by a
technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under
this title in a work or a portion thereof.
17 U.S.C. S 1201(b)(1).
.. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 323.
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monitor of the DVD player, etc. As the district court observed, "of course,
one might quote the verbal portion of the soundtrack, rerecord both verbal
and non-verbal portions of the soundtrack [of a copy-controlled DVD], and
videotape or otherwise record images produced on a monitor when the DVD
is played on a compliant DVD player." 19 Such limited privileges, however,
fail to secure for Carla the right to make digital fair uses of creative works.
In essence, the fair use privilege that is preserved for Carla and users like her
in the digital realm is the privilege of making analog uses of digital works, a
privilege that will ring hollow with the progressive migration of creative
works to the digital realm.
The end result of Section 120 1's prohibitions on the act of circumvention
and on the "trafficking in" circumvention technologies is that prospective
authors will essentially be prohibited from making digital fair uses of
technologically-protected works of authorship, and will be unable to carry
forth into the digital realm the fair use privileges that they have historically
enjoyed in the pre-digital realm. In passing the DMCA in an effort to
prevent the unfair copying of digital works, Congress also has essentially
prohibited the fair copying of digital works protected by technological
measures.
Next consider Scenarios Two and Three, in which Carla wishes to
exercise the privileges traditionally granted to her by copyright law with
respect to the public domain Chaplin films released, each with a new

introduction, on a CSS-protected DVD. Because the underlying films
themselves are no longer protected by copyright, Carla enjoys the legal right
under the Copyright Act to make whatever uses she pleases of the films. But
because the films, packaged with their added introductions, are protected by
copyright" 0 and because the DVDs on which the films are stored are
protected by copy control devices, under the analysis set forth above, Carla
would be unable to make any digital copies of the film and would be
required to resort to making analog copies or copying an analog version of
the film-if one is available to her. This is especially troubling with respect
to Scenario Three, where the encrypted digital version of the film is the only
version available. By combining a copyrightable introduction with a public
domain work, and then locking up the combined work with access and copy
control devices, an "author" can create virtually unlimited exclusive rights
"9 i at 322 n.160.

"W See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 176, at 712.
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in a largely uncopyrightable work. Furthermore, the copyright holder in the
Chaplin film can use technological measures to parlay a copyright of limited
term into a perpetual right, merely by adding a new introduction at the end
of each copyright term and then locking up the entire work using access
control and copy control devices.
In short, technological measures countenanced by the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act used to control access to works of authorship, coupled with
the Act's prohibitions on trafficking in technology that defeats access and
copy control devices, render fair use limitations on creators' rights in
technologically-protected digital works essentially meaningless.
Furthermore, the Act's anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions
enable such creators to parlay their durationally limited copyright rights into
unlimited rights in their works. Even though the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act creates exceptions for certain fair use communities and for
certain types of fair uses, and even though the act of circumventing copy
control devices is technically not prohibited, the Act's anti-trafficking
provisions will operate to prohibit the vast majority of users from
circumventing copy control devices in order to make fair use copies of
technologically-protected works and in order to access public domain
elements of creative works. Section 1201's countenance of the use of
technological measures to control access to and copying of works, coupled
with its ban on trafficking in circumvention technology, will render users
who are not encryption software developers" unable to make fair use digital
copies of works or to use the portions of such works that are unprotected by
copyright. Despite the asserted intentions of its drafters,' the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act fails to carry forth into the digital realm the
limitations on authors' rights historically imposed by copyright law. Instead,
the DMCA essentially freezes future authors' ability to exercise fair use
within the analog realm, prevents them from exercising their fair use
privileges within the digital realm, and enables present authors to circumvent
the durational limits imposed on copyright rights.

22

See, eg., id at 739-40 ('1f the courts apply Section 1201 as written, the only users whose interests

are truly safeguarded are those few who personally possess sufficient expertise to counteract whatever
technological measures are placed in their path.").
m See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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B. CONTRACTUAL MEASURES AND PRIVATE ORDERING OF RIGHTS IN
CREATIVE WORKS

In addition to using technological measures to control access to and
copying of their works, authors of digital works are also turning to
contractual measures to privately order their rights. For example, authors
of electronic books are resorting to contractual measures to establish
virtually unlimited rights in their works. Authors such as Stephen King are
using contractual measures to control uses of their own works, while others
are using such measures to create for themselves rights in public domain
works. Glassbook's e-book of Lewis Carroll's classic Alice's Adventures in
Wonderland, for example, was made available with terms prohibiting the
copying, printing, or reading aloud of the work.23 The use of such
contractual measures, like the use of technological measures, enables authors
to create rights in their works that are not subject to the limitations
historically imposed by copyright law to advance the societal creative process
and to protect the interests of future authors. Because the topic of
shrinkwrap and clickwrap licenses has been explored elsewhere in the
literature,2 4 I will not reiterate the arguments for and against the
enforcement of such license terms here, but will instead briefly outline the
salient features of such licenses and examine the ways in which they can be
used to establish rights in creative works that are not subject to the
limitations historically imposed by copyright law.
Shrinkwrap or clickwrap licenses are licenses that establish the terms and
conditions for the use of electronic works. For example, in acquiring a
software program" s or a work of literature26 over the Internet, a user will
likely be required to agree to the terms and conditions established by the
author of such works as a pre-requisite to her purchase and use of the work.
The terms of such licenses typically augment the author's rights and limit the
purchaser's privileges relative to those enjoyed by the parties under

23

See supra note 172 and accompanying text.

n See, eg., Mark Lemley, Beyond Preemption. Tbe Law and Policy ofIntellectualProperyLicensing,
87 CAL. L. REV. 111 (1999); Michael Madison, Legal-Ware: Contractand Copyrightin the DigitalAge,67
FoP.DHAML.REv. 1025 (1998); David Nimmer et al., TbeMetamorpbosisof Contractinto Expand,87 CAL.
L. REV. 17 (1999); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Propertyand ContractLawfor the InformationAge, 87

CAL. L. REv. 1 (1999).
s See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
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copyright law.2 7 For example, the license terms may prohibit users from
making fair use type copies of the work,228 or from copying portions of the
work that are unprotectable by copyright, such as the facts or ideas
contained within the work-or, in the case of public domain works, from
copying the entire underlying work itself."n The license terms may also
purport to extend such rights in perpetuity, 20 in contrast to the rights of
limited duration granted to authors under copyright law. Such license terms,
if embedded within the subject works, must be confronted and assented to
before accessing such works, and are therefore binding upon all those who
subsequently make use of such works. For example, the developer of a
software program might embed a license within the program itself so that
anyone who operates the program is first made to agree to the custom license
terms governing its use, terms that may prohibit users from accessing the
unprotectable ideas embodied in such works or forbid the reproduction of
other components of the work that are unprotected by copyright, such as
facts or data. 2 1 Interestingly, the Contents Scramble System-the encryption
software program used to control unauthorized access to and copying of
films stored on DVDs-is itself governed by an electronic license that
prohibits users from accessing and copying elements of the program that are
unprotected by copyright or from exercising their fair use privileges with
respect to the program.23 2 And, although contractual provisions generally
have limited effect in that they bind only those who are parties to the
contract, in the case of embedded licenses, there are no relevant non-parties
to such licenses, no users of the licensed works who are not also bound by
the relevant license terms. As discussed below, given the embedded nature
of such licenses, any user is first made to confront and assent to the terms of
the embedded license.
Clickwrap licenses, unlike technological protection measures, are not selfenforcing and therefore the rights created by such licenses must be enforced
by the courts, which have the discretion to refuse to enforce license terms

2

See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 224.

no I

See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1448.
See infra note 243 and accompanying text.
' See, eg., ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1448.
22 See, eg., DVD Copy Control Assoc. v. McLaughlin, Defendant's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Opposition to Order to Show Cause re Preliminary Injunction, available at http://www.
eff.org/IP/Video/DVDCCA.case/20000107-pi-motionresponse.html (1ast visited Apr. 28, 2002).
2"

"o
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that are overreaching, inconsistent with fundamental public policies, or that
stand as obstacles to the achievement of copyright law's objectives.3 3 Thus
far, however, courts have been largely sympathetic to efforts by authors to
expand their rights via contract. The Seventh Circuit's analysis in ProCDv.
Zeidenbergis illustrative of courts' willingness to uphold shrinkwrap license
terms that eviscerate the limitations on authors' rights traditionally imposed
by copyright law. ProCDinvolved the enforceability of a clickwrap license
embedded within a software package that contained a database of telephone
listings.
The terms of ProCD's embedded license prohibited the
reproduction and distribution of the elements of the phone directory, even
though such elements-because purely factual-were unprotected by
copyright.234 Zeidenberg, who had purchased and used the software and was
therefore required to have assented to its license terms, nevertheless went on
to copy and distribute the contents of the directory in violation of the
license. 3 In response to ProCD's breach of contract argument, Zeidenberg
asserted that the subject license terms were preempted by the Copyright Act,
which preempts the enforcement of property-like rights that are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights granted by the Copyright Act. 36 The district
court credited Zeidenberg's argument and held that the license essentially
purported to create for ProCD the exclusive and unlimited right to
reproduce and distribute the work, in contravention of copyright law's
preemption provision.23 The Seventh Circuit, however, ruled that the
license merely created a bilateral contract right, not a property-like right, and
that therefore the license was not rendered unenforceable by the force of
copyright law's preemption provision.23
The Seventh Circuit's ruling in ProCD misunderstands the nature of
embedded licenses and fails to appreciate that embedded licenses can be used
to create rights against the (relevant) world that are in conflict with the

...
See Calif. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280 (1987). See also Robert P. Merges,
InteUectualPropertyand the Costs of CommercialExchang" A Review Essay, 93 MIC. L. REV. 1570, 1613
(1995) ("Standard form software licensing contracts, by virtue of their very uniformity and the

immutability-in other words, non-negotiability-of their provisions, have the same generality of scope
as the state legislation that is often the target of federal preemption."). The Copyright Act also contains
a statutory preemption provision. See 17 U.S.C. S 301.
24 See, eg., Feist v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
23sSee ProCD,86 F.3d at 1448.
23. See i (construing copyright law's statutory preemption provision, set forth at 17 U.S.C. S 301).
s ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
23 ProCD,86 F.3d 1447, 1453-54.
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limited rights granted to authors by copyright law. In attempting to
distinguish between property rights created by the Copyright Act and
contract rights created by the license governing the program at issue, the
court observed that "someone who found a copy of [the program] on the
street would not be affected by the shrinkwrap license." 9 But in setting
forth this hypothetical, the court failed to appreciate that the license at issue
was embedded within the software. Upon inserting the software in one's disk
drive, the first screen that came up would require the user to assent to the
license terms prohibiting such copying or to exit the program. Although it
is ordinarily the case that a third party to a contract is not bound by the
license's terms-and that if the original licensee were to give the software to
a stranger on the bus, the stranger would not be bound by the license
terms-the same does not hold true of the embedded license scenario.
Absent tampering with the embedded license-which itself would be
ilegal2 -there are no strangers to such license terms: all who use such
works are bound by its terms. Thus, embedded contractual measures used
by authors to privately order their rights in their works create property-like
rights that are good against the (relevant) world, rights which may well
conflict with the limited rights in creative works traditionally granted to
authors under copyright law.
Legislatures are following the lead of courts in their willingness to
countenance authors' use of clickwrap licenses to create unlimited rights for
themselves. The much-criticized241 Uniform Computer Information42
Transactions Act (UCITA), the latest instantiation of the much-criticized
proposed Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code, provides a
comprehensive set of default rules that enable authors of "informational
works"-including works protected by copyright-to use licenses to create
rights for themselves that are not subject to copyright law's traditional
limitations on authors' rights. For example, authors of certain works are
permitted under UCITA's scheme to create perpetual rights in their

2" Id at 1453.
240 Under 17 U.S.C. S 1202, tampering with the embedded license would likely constitute illegal
alteration of copyright management information.
241 See, ag., PratikA. Shah, The Uniform ComputerInformation TransactionsAct,15BERKELEYTECH.
L.J. 85 (2000).
242 See generally Symposium, IntellectualPropery and Contract Law for the Information Age7 The
Impact ofArticle 2B ofthe Uniform Commercial Code on the Futureof Informationand Commerce, 87 CAL.
L. REV. 1 (1999).
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works." And while clickwrap license terms that .violate "fundamental
public policies" are supposedly subject to a heightened unconscionability
standard,2." it is uncertain whether courts will use such a standard to render
unenforceable license terms requiring users to forgo their fair use privileges
or their rights to access ideas or other elements of licensed works that are
unprotectible by copyright.
In sum, technological measures, such as access-control and copy-control
devices that prohibit the reproduction of all or any part of creative works,
along with contractual measures, such as clickwrap licenses, that require

users to forgo their privilege to make fair uses of works or to reproduce
unprotected elements in creative works, threaten to erode the limitations
that copyright law has traditionally imposed on authors' rights to advance
the societal creative process and to safeguard the interests of future authors.
V. ENFORCING JUSTICE BETWEEN AUTHORS: BUILDING LIMITATIONS
BACK INTO AUTHORS' PRIVATELY ORDERED RIGHTS

As I established in Parts I and II, concerns of justice between authors
justify mandating the "savings" of certain aspects of creative works for the
benefit of future authors, where the "savings" of such works is translated into
limitations on authors' rights. Deliberating behind a Rawlsian veil of
ignorance, authors who had obscured from them information as to which
creative generation they would belong upon leaving the original position
would opt for a system of limited rights in creative works. Authors
deliberating under such conditions would conclude that the imposition of
such limitations is necessary to ensure that all authors, no matter when along
the timeline of society they were to create, would have available to them the
raw materials required to exercise-their creative rights. Copyright law over
the centuries has come to embody limitations on authors' rights that
approximate the savings of creative works that would be adopted by authors
deliberating in the original position, taking into account the interests and
incentives operating upon authors in both earlier and later periods of time.
The private ordering of authors' rights-via technological measures as
countenanced by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and via contractual
licenses is in perpetuity).
See, eg., Mary Jo Howard Dively & Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Ozerview of Uniform Computer

243See UCrTA S 308 (default term for certain software and other
24

Information TransactionsAct, 618 PLI/PAT. 113, 125 (2000).
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measures increasingly upheld by the courts-fails to carry over into the
digital realm the limitations that are justified by a Rawlsian analysis of justice
between authors. As set forth in Part I.A above, authors deliberating behind
a veil of ignorance, who knew not which period along the timeline of society
they would create and who would therefore wish to preserve for all authors
the raw materials necessary to create, would opt for several types of
limitations on authors' rights. In particular, authors deliberating behind the
veil would adopt a savings principle (1)that would permit future authors to
make use of the essential raw materials of the creative process, including
ideas and ideational elements embodied in creative works; (2) that would
permit future authors to make transformative uses even of the nonideational
elements of creative works; (3) that would permit future authors to make
evaluative uses of creative works; and possibly (4) that would impose
durational limits on rights in creative works.24
Courts called upon to enforce rights in creative works established via
technological and contractual measures should recognize the continued
importance of limiting authors' rights for the benefit of future authors in the
private ordering regime as they have in the publicly ordered copyright
regime. Toward that end, the right granted to authors under Section 1201
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act to prohibit the circumvention of
technological measures used to control access to creative works should be
limited in the interests of future authors. Courts should construe the Section
1201 right to control access to one's work to be subject to the four types of
limitations on authors' rights identified above. Specifically, courts should
carve out a fair use type exception for those who circumvent technological
protection measures in order to access the ideational components of
protected works, to make transformative or evaluative uses of such works,
or to access components of the works that are unprotectible by copyright.
Second, courts should construe Section 1201's prohibitions on trafficking in

24 Other types of limitations on authors' rights traditionally imposed by copyright law, such as fair
use privileges solely justified under a transactions costs analysis, may or may not be justified in the digital
realm, depending upon whether the digital realm's promise of reduced transactions costs is fulfilled. To
the extent, for example, that copyright law permits the fair use of a prior creative work because of high
search costs, tracing costs, or similar transactions costs that impose logistical barriers to a later author's
negotiation with an earlier author, the royalty-free licenses mandated under copyright law's fair use
doctrine may no longer be justified in the digital realm. But the justifications for other types of fair
uses-including transformative and evaluative uses of earlier works-survive the migration of works to
the digital realm.
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access-control and copy-control defeating technologies to permit the making
available of technologies to facilitate the circumvention of access-control and
copy-control devices where necessary to allow users to access ideas and
ideational elements embodied in such works, to allow users to make
transformative or evaluative uses of such works, and to, allow users to access
the public domain content contained within technologically protected
works.

Finally, courts construing contractual measures that expand authors'
rights relative to the rights granted under copyright law should strike down
provisions that stand as obstacles to the enforcement of copyright law's
objectives-viz., promoting the progress of science and the useful arts and
advancing the societal creative process by protecting the interests of future
authors. In states implementing the UCITA, courts should construe
UCITA's "violation of public policy" language broadly to strike down
contractual provisions that fail to preserve for future authors the raw
materials of the creative process or that are otherwise not limited in
accordance with concerns for justice between authors as described above.
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